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Articles
The Political Marketplace of Religion
CALVIN MASSEY*

INTRODUCTION

Fashions in constitutional law, like hemlines, rise and fall. One such
fashion is the degree to which courts should defer to legislative
judgments concerning religion in public life. There may be many reasons
why the Religion Clauses seem to be particularly prone to the whims of
constitutional fashion; indeed, the vast panoply of legal writing dissecting
the doctrinal nuances of the Religion Clauses-a corpus that combines
an enormous range of perspectives with a depth approaching that of the
Marianas Trench-suggests that doctrinal analysis is slippery,
treacherous, and ultimately unlikely to produce a satisfactory answer.'
Some commentators suggest that a "political perspective," 2 which
analyzes "Establishment Clause decisions as if they were products of
political contests among various interest groups, both religious and
secular, with competing positions on the proper relation of church and
state,"3 is preferable in that it "yields an explanatory and predictive
account of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is useful and
informative." 4 Others offer metaphysical explanations of the
jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. Professor Frederick Mark
Gedicks, for example, argues that the Religion Clauses doctrine, at least
until the I98os, was a product of Enlightenment modernity, and that with
the replacement of modernity by post-modern skepticism of any account
of truth, the Religion Clauses doctrine has assumed a new shape, one
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
i. The literature is so voluminous that a complete summary would constitute a bibliography that
would consume the paper. A useful and reasonably comprehensive bibliography of commentary and
source materials germane to the Religion Clauses may be found in MICHAEL MCCONNELL, JOHN
GARVEY & THOMAS BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUnON 917 (2002).
2. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, ioo
MICH. L. REV. 279, 280 (20OI).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 284.
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focused more on preventing discrimination against religion or among
religions rather than preserving separation of the secular and religious
domains.5 Each of the political and metaphysical perspectives is useful
and informative, but neither provides a complete account of the variable
deference that the Supreme Court has paid to legislative judgments
about the proper boundary between church and state.
I accept the validity of the metaphysical and political perspectives as
relevant explanations of the underlying popular dynamic that has
contributed to shifting judicial views of the force of the Religion Clauses,
but I seek to go further. In this Article, I set forth a description of four
doctrinal patterns that account for the total range of variance that can be
observed in the Court's jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses; I identify
the pattern in current fashion; I engage in a normative inquiry as to
whether that pattern is either workable constitutional law or desirable
public policy. Finally, I conclude with some predictions about the future
shape of doctrine governing the Religion Clauses. In doing so, I discuss
the forces-whether metaphysical, political, or cultural-that have
influenced the creation and development of these patterns, and offer
some predictions and prescriptions for future doctrine in light of these
forces.
Part I identifies and discusses the four patterns behind the Court's
jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. Each describes an outcome in
which the field of permissible legislative action to accommodate or
restrict the role of religion in public life is significantly different from that
in any of the other three outcomes. Part I also suggests that the currently
fashionable outcome is what I call the "legislative primacy" pattern and
offers some thoughts about the reasons for its ascendance. Part II
addresses the questions of whether legislative primacy is either workable
law or socially desirable, by identifying the implications of legislative
primacy. Part II suggests that the legislative primacy pattern, at least in
its present form, has a self-constraining quality seen in the Court's
commitment to striking down public aid that prefers religion to
secularism, or aid that prefers some sects over others. If that constraint
should be jettisoned, however, more troubling implications and answers
emerge.
I. THE FOUR PATTERNS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

A recurring, central problem presented by the Religion Clauses is
the inherent tension between them. This is not fresh news; nevertheless,
the problem loses none of its punch by virtue of its familiarity. While the
Religion Clauses may be harmonized at a high level of generality-both
5. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (2005) [hereinafter Spiritualityand Fundamentalism].
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concern preservation of religious liberty by creating separate spheres for
government and religion-the harmony dissipates almost as soon as the
task of application begins. For once the constitutional rubber hits the
religious road, it becomes apparent that some accommodations of
religion that facilitate its free exercise may offend the prohibition against
governmental establishments of religion, and that some measures taken
to prevent prohibited establishments might offend the guarantee of free
exercise of religion.6
Constitutional law seeks to mediate this tension through familiar
devices that chart the boundaries of the free exercise guarantee and the
prohibition of religious establishments. Any doctrine that seeks to
mediate the tension between the Religion Clauses, however, will result in
one of four outcomes. Each of those outcomes will leave legislatures with
a different field of action and oblige judges to act upon a separate
domain.
First, judges can interpret the Free Exercise Clause generously by
mandating governmental accommodation of religious conduct and
simultaneously police the Establishment Clause vigorously by restricting
the ability of governments to accommodate or aid religion. Such doctrine
will leave to legislatures a relatively small zone of permitted action,
whether to foster free exercise or to accommodate religious institutions.
For the sake of discussion, I call this the "judicial primacy" outcome, and
it is schematically depicted in Figure i.
Second, the judiciary can interpret the free exercise guarantee
narrowly by imposing on governments very few required
accommodations of religious conduct and, at the same time, enforce the
Establishment Clause prohibition lackadaisically by prohibiting very few
governmental accommodations of or assistance to religion. This doctrinal
result leaves to legislatures a large range of permitted action, whether to
promote free exercise of religious belief or to accommodate religion.
This is the "legislative primacy" outcome, depicted in Figure 2.

6. This is not the only possible manner in which to express the relationship between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Other possibilities include the following: (i) The clauses say
the same thing in different locutions; (2) The Establishment Clause only applies to government action
that benefits religion and the Free Exercise Clause only applies to government action that burdens
religion; (3) The Free Exercise Clause protects religious belief from government action that coerces
expressions of belief or non-belief and the Establishment Clause protects the secular governance
process from undue religious interference. McCONNELL ET AL., supra note I, at 3. The first possibility is
belied by the case law; the second may be true but hides the tension implicit in identifying and
separating benefits from burdens; and the third may also be true but operates as a method of
mediating the tension between the two clauses. As seen by the discussion that accompanies notes 6540, I view this final possibility as a variant of the legislative primacy pattern, though it could be
subsumed under the judicial secularism pattern if courts invalidated most governmental extensions of
benefits to religion as impermissible establishments of religion. See infra text accompanying notes 141-
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Third, judicial doctrine can generally decline to require governments
to accommodate religious conduct in the name of free exercise and
simultaneously enforce the establishment prohibition robustly through a
broad denial of governmental power to accommodate religion. This
pattern will leave to legislatures limited freedom to assist religious
exercise because any such legislative initiatives must occur only within
the shadow of broad judicially created limits on government action in the
name of enforcing the limits of the Establishment Clause. This is the
"judicial secularism" outcome, which is represented in Figure 3.
Finally, the courts can aggressively require governments to
accommodate religious conduct in order to facilitate free exercise and
simultaneously permit governments broad latitude to accommodate or
assist religion without running afoul of the Establishment Clause. Strict
enforcement of the free exercise guarantee coupled with lax enforcement
of the establishment prohibition will leave to legislatures considerable
freedom to accommodate and aid religion, especially because the
occasions for conflict between the requirements of Free Exercise and the
limits of non-Establishment will be rare. This is the "judicial
accommodation of religion" outcome set forth in Figure 4.
Each of these outcomes can be depicted graphically, as follows.
Figure r: Judicial Primacy
Establishment
Forbidden
Accommodations

Free Exercise
Permissible
Accommodations

Required
Accommodations

Figure2: Legislative Primacy
Establishment
Forbidden
Accommodations

Free Exercise
Permissible
Accommodations

Required
Accommodations

Figure3: Judicial Secularism
Establishment
Forbidden
Accommodations

Free Exercise
Permissible
Required
Accommodations Accommodations
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Figure 4: Judicial Accommodation of Religion
Free Exercise

Forbidden
Permissible
Accommodations Accommodations

Required
Accommodations

A few preliminary comments on this taxonomy may be helpful.
There is nothing rigid about these patterns. At some point, any given
pattern can slide into one of the others by adjustments in doctrine that
focus on one of the two poles. Moreover, even if the general outline of
doctrine indicates an embrace of one of the patterns, there are likely to
be some issues on which the doctrine is inconsistent with the overall
pattern. This does not destroy the utility of the pattern taxonomy; it does
suggest that the patterns are useful devices to capture the broad picture
of the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. The following observations
must be taken with these caveats in mind.
Judicial primacy, represented by Figure i, was the position of the
Supreme Court, roughly speaking, in the era of Everson v. Board of
Education,7 Engel v. Vitale,' Abington School District v. Schempp,9 and
Sherbert v. Verner.'" More precisely, while the position of the Court
vacillated during that era, judicial primacy emerges as the clear result
after combining the views of the Everson dissenters (who agreed with the
Everson majority as to the principles governing Establishment Clause
claims, but disagreed as to the application of those principles to the facts
in the case) and the Court's majority in Engel, Schempp, and Sherbert. It
is my contention that Figure 2, legislative primacy, reflects the position of
the Court today, following such cases as Employment Division v. Smith,"
Agostini v. Felton,2 Mitchell v. Helms, 3 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,'4 and
Locke v. Davey.'" The judicial secularism model depicted in Figure 3 has
existed mostly in the minds of commentators. It is perhaps best captured
by Philip Kurland's 1961 article, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court,"" in which he argued that the two Religion Clauses "should be
read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a
standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit
7. 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947). One might argue that the result of Everson belied its rhetoric, which was
certainly the position of the dissenters.
8. 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
9. 374 U.S.203, 222 (1963).
tO. 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
It. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
12. 521 U.S. 203, 234 0997).
13. 530 U.S. 793, 8ol (2ooo).
14. 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2oo2).
15. 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (2004).

16. Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REV. 1,6 (I96I).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1I

classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden."" Figure 4, the judicial accommodation of religion pattern, has
also never existed in the collective judicial mind of the Supreme Court,
but has managed to capture some individual legal minds. Perhaps the
most well-known advocate of this model is Professor and Judge Michael
McConnell, who argues that a principle of equality should mediate the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. As applied, McConnell's
equality principle would limit governmental assistance to religion by
forbidding only preferential treatment of religion or of any particular
sect; furthermore, in order to deliver on the promise of the free exercise
guarantee, the principle would require governments to accommodate
religious conduct, because the failure
to do so would impose special and
8
unequal burdens upon religion.
A.

JUDICIAL PRIMACY

The judicial primacy pattern stems from twin propositions. With
respect to the Free Exercise Clause, proponents of judicial primacy
contend that the clause protects not only religious belief itself but also
some conduct that represents the manifestation of religious belief. 9 With
respect to the Establishment Clause, advocates of judicial primacy assert
that it would be inconsistent with the non-Establishment principle to
allow governments to use religion as a basis to confer special benefits
upon religion or religious believers." The Free Exercise Clause
17. Id.

I. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination, in EQUAL
(Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds.,
1998); Michael McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should be
Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639; Michael McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 11o9 (199o); Michael McConnell, Freedom
from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia's Historical
Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819 (1998); Michael McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992); Michael McConnell, State Action
and the Supreme Court's Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private
Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681 (2OOl).
19. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-04 (1963) (The Free Exercise Clause prohibits
"any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such" and governmental imposition of burdens
upon "the practice of... religion," unless the government justifies such burdens as necessary to
accomplish a compelling government objective. (emphasis added)).
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 725 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Establishment Clause bespeaks a 'government... stripped of all power.., to support, or otherwise to
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

assist any or all religions....'

(quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 1' (1947))). See also

Abington School District v. Schempp, in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
proposition that the Establishment Clause "comprehensively forbid[s] every form of public aid or
support for religion." 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 32 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)); see also McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.. 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring)
("We renew our conviction that 'we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that
complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion."'
(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 59)).
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proposition is partly founded upon a reading of the historical record2
and partly upon notions of equality." Similarly, the Establishment Clause
proposition is grounded in history23 and in practical considerations of
separating secular life from religious life.
Sherbert v. Verner presents the exemplar of the Free Exercise half of
the judicial primacy pattern.24 South Carolina denied unemployment
benefits to Sherbert because she refused to "accept available suitable
work" when offered to her. 5 Sherbert refused to accept jobs that entailed
working on Saturdays because the tenets of her Seventh Day Adventist
faith forbade such labor. Because South Carolina's law worked to
"impede the observance of... religion[], '':6 the Court found it "clear"
that the law imposed "a burden on the free exercise of [Sherbert's]
religion."'" Such a burden could be justified only by South Carolina's
21. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1459-61 (199o) (contending that the "federal Free Exercise
Clause seems.., to have followed the most expansive" (id. at 146o-6i) state constitutional guarantees
of free exercise, provisions that "protected all actions stemming from religious conviction, subject to
certain limitations" (id. at 1459). But see Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 6o GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 932, 947 (1992) (arguing that the
state constitutional guarantees relied upon by McConnell do not support the conclusion that they
"provided a constitutional right of religious exemption from civil laws," and that the attitudes of
eighteenth-century Americans were not only inconsistent with such a reading of the Establishment
Clause but also served as evidence of their concern that a "right of exemption for the religiously
scrupulous could be considered a law respecting religion," and thus an establishment of religion). By
citing McConnell's article, I do not mean to imply that McConnell falls into the judicial primacy camp;
as will be clear to those familiar with his entire oeuvre, he is far better characterized as holding to the
judicial accommodation pattern.
22. Justice Stevens, for example, has defended Sherbert by contending that its rule "is necessary
to protect religious observers against unequal treatment." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n
of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for Religious Conduct, 6i U. CHI. L.

Rav. 1245, 1285, 1287 (994)

(The Free Exercise Clause requires governments to "treat the deep,

religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by
the deep concerns of citizens generally," a principle that justifies Sherbert because South Carolina's
refusal of unemployment benefits to Sherbert, the appellant, "represent[ed] a failure of equal
regard.").
23. See Hamburger, supra note 21, at 947 ("A right of exemption for the religiously scrupulous
could be considered a law respecting religion [that] could create unequal civil rights" tilted toward
religion.). The 1786 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom-the culmination of the fight
over continuation of mandatory public support of the Anglican church-provided that "all men shall
be free to profess [and] maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
[way] diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities." 12 Statutes at Large of Virginia 86 (W. W.
Hening ed., 1823) (emphasis added). But see McConnell, supra note 21, at 15 11-12 (Because there "is
no substantial [historical] evidence that [religious] exemptions were considered constitutionally
questionable, whether as a form of establishment or as an invasion of liberty of conscience ... , [the]
modern argument against religious exemptions, based on the Establishment Clause, is ...historically
unsupportable.").
24. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
25. Id. at 401.
26. Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
27. Id. at 403. Sherbert's "ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion
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proof that the burden placed upon Sherbert's religion was necessary to
the achievement of a compelling interest, a standard that South Carolina
was unable to meet. Nor was the extent of this protection to free exercise
a forbidden establishment of religion; rather, it "reflect[ed] nothing more
than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences.28
The language, if not the result, of Everson v. Board of Education29
represents the judicial primacy pattern at work with respect to the
Establishment Clause. At issue was New Jersey's practice of permitting
public school districts to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting
their children to and from religious schools by means of the public bus
system. The Court was unanimous that the Establishment Clause
stripped governments "of all power.., to support or otherwise to assist
any or all religions," including the power to "pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."3 The
Court divided on the application of this principle. The majority thought
that the reimbursement did not offend the Establishment Clause because
the clause "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them."'" To the dissenters, the majority's
conclusion represented a "failure to apply the principles it avow[ed]."32
Justice Jackson noted that "[rleligious teaching cannot be a private affair
when the state seeks to impose regulations which infringe on it indirectly,
and a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith to aid
another, or those of no faith to aid all."33 The remaining dissenters, led by
Justice Rutledge, argued that the purpose of the Establishment Clause
"was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion"' and that this purpose was
undermined by the majority's approval of the aid at issue in Everson.
The early school prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale 5 and Abington School
District v. Schempp," applied the Everson principle more stringently. It
[and] the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable.... Governmental imposition of
such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id. at 404.
28. Id. at 409.
29. 330 U.S. 1,11 (1947).
30. Id. at i1, 15.
31. Id. at is8.

Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 27.
34. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
32.

35. 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962).
36. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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"is no part of the business of government," said the Engel majority, "to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government."37 The
Establishment Clause "rested on the belief that a union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion,""3 and
thus "withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the
expression thereof."39
In Everson, Engel, and Schempp, the Court relied heavily on its
reading of history to divine the purposes of the Religion Clauses. The
principles embodied in these cases and in Sherbert, however, also
resulted from the coalescence of political factors and a cultural
consciousness in mid-twentieth-century America. Dean Jeffries and
Professor Ryan explain the separationist impulse of Everson as resulting
from the demise of Protestant hegemony,4' producing a concomitant
Protestant fear of and opposition to growing Catholic political power
focused on obtaining public aid to Catholic schools,4" an opposition that
"was strongly supported by American Jewry."42 According to Jeffries and
Ryan, the Court's "campaign to oust religion from the public schools was
never as popular as its ban against aid to religious schools"43 and
succeeded partly because "America's Protestants were not united.., on
the issue."' Given this reading, Sherbert merely represents the other side
of the neutrality coin; to paraphrase Justice Jackson, if aid to religious
conduct is not a proper public affair then neither is it proper for the
public to impede religious conduct. Professor Gedicks asserts that,
because the Court during the Everson period was part of a society
steeped
in the metaphysical understanding
of the western
Enlightenment, the Court regarded religion as an "aberrant practice in a
secular democracy"45 that "needed to be constitutionally separated from
public life, ' 6 and justified "discriminatory burdens on religious beliefs
and practices.., in order to preserve political freedom."47 This reading
explains Everson and its progeny but does not account as well for
Sherbert. Accordingly, some of Professor Gedicks's observations are

37. Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
38. Id. at 431.
39. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
40. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 305-12.
41. ld. at 312-18.
42. Id. at 316.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Spiritualityand Fundamentalism,supra note 5, at 1210.
Id.

47. Id.; see also FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 19-21 (1995)
(describing a doctrinal regime of secular neutrality devoted to creating a "wholly secular society").
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more germane to a discussion of the judicial secularism pattern, 4 but the
gist of his argument is also highly pertinent to an adequate explanation of
judicial primacy. Unlike Jeffries and Ryan, however, Gedicks explains
this doctrine in metaphysical rather than political terms.
The "modern" world-the world ushered into the West by the
Enlightenment-replaced the medieval fixation upon the Christian faith
as the absolute and final explanation of reality with the notion that
rational inquiry could provide true explanations for natural phenomena
and the human condition alike.49 In essence, the Enlightenment
substituted rationality for faith as the basis for apprehending truth, but
both the modern and the pre-modern ages were united in the pursuit of
truth. However, the modern age's reliance on rationality as the engine of
truth "eventually came to signify a secular challenge to all of
Christianity,"5 a challenge that caused Christianity to fracture into two
camps. One camp adapted to modernity "by discarding the doctrines and
beliefs which modernity had discredited"5' and thus became reduced to
offering the "'God of the gaps,"' a God that could "explain only what
science could not." 2 The other camp rejected modernity totally and
either retreated to the shadows of public life or preserved its pre-modern
faith as a purely private enterprise. Of course, this ceded public life to
those with no faith at all or only a diluted faith in the puny "God of the
gaps."
Modernity did not deliver on its promise, however, and we now live
in a post-modern world, one in which we lack "an account of the place
and purpose of humanity that would infuse every life with the same
ultimate meaning." 3 We no longer believe in objectivity or universality.
We reject the possibility of apprehending truth; we now live in an age of
radical disengagement, for we no longer think that we can know anything
for sure. All is unexplainable myth, for even the "ideal of the elimination
of myth is a myth."54 The paradox
of post-modernism is that because it
"rejects all universal narratives,"55 it opens the door to the return of
religion, for if nothing is certain, there is no longer any reason to exclude
48. See infra text accompanying notes 138-64. As will be seen in this discussion of the judicial
secularism pattern, Professor Gedicks's characterization is a better, but still partial, account of the
period from roughly 1947 until 3963, the date of the Sherbert decision. During that era the operative
Free Exercise model held that generally applicable regulations of conduct could validly circumscribe
religious conduct but that coercion of conduct inimical to religious belief was void. For the former
proposition, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878); for the latter proposition, see
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
49. Spiritualityand Fundamentalism,supra note 5, at 1199-1203.
50. Id. at 1201-02.
51. Id. at 1202.
52. Id. at 1203.
53. Id. at I197.
54. GIANNI VATrMO, AFrER CHRISTIANITY 29 (Luca D'Isanto trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2002).

55. Spiritualityand Fundamentalism,supra note 5, at 12o7.
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any narrative from the babble of post-modernist conversation. The
consequences of this phenomenon on the development of Religion
Clauses doctrine may be deferred until later; 6 for now we need only to
focus on the effects of modernity on Religion Clauses doctrine.
Modernity replaced belief, the medieval universal account of
existence, with rational inquiry, its own universal account of existence.
Modernity simply substituted a new and competing meta-narrative for
the medieval meta-narrative. As a result, the thoroughly modern midtwentieth century justices of the United States Supreme Court could
hardly be expected to tolerate religion and secular governance lying in
the same bed. After all, the American nation was a brilliant experiment
in modernity, and its maintenance depended partly on exclusion of the
principal competing meta-narrative. A natural objection to this line of
thought, however, is to note that until the mid-twentieth century, the
Supreme Court took no notice of the existence of a de facto Protestant
establishment. The explanation is partly doctrinal and partly political.
Until after the Civil War, the Religion Clauses did not apply to the
states, and it was in the states where issues of government aid to or
inhibition of religion were engaged.57 For a good portion of the antebellum period, the issue was posed in the context of the elimination of
officially established churches." This represented a contest between
modernity and a vestigial remnant of the medieval sensibility; until the
contest reached a resolution in modernity's favor it is not surprising that
the more general attributes of modernity's role with respect to religion
remained absent in this era. Moreover, in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, Protestant hegemony was preserved by using the political
56. See text accompanying notes 270-73.
57. See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 300-01 (discussing the 184os clash between
Catholics and Protestants in New York over public assistance to religious schools).
58. The classic and most influential of these contests was, of course, the struggle to disestablish
the Anglican Church in Virginia. The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights declared that "all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion." 7 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, etc. 3812-14 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., I9O9). In 1776, the Virginia legislature abolished
taxation of non-members of the Anglican Church for support of the Anglican Church. 9 Virginia
Statutes at Large 164 (William W. Hening ed., 1776). In 1779, the legislature did the same for members
of the Anglican Church, io Virginia Statutes at Large 197, supra, but in 1784, the Virginia legislature
considered adoption of the Assessment Bill, which would have levied a property tax, the proceeds of
which were to be paid over to the various Christian religious denominations in Virginia to support the
clergy in the teaching of their respective faiths. Though the bill was couched in terms of aiding
Christianity alone, it must be noted that, for all practical purposes, Virginia in 1784 did not contain any
non-Christian clergy. See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM io9-io (1967). The Assessment
Bill sparked Madison's 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 183 (i900), and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted by the
Virginia legislature immediately after the defeat of the Assessment Bill. 12 Virginia Statutes at Large
84, supra. An account of the Assessment Bill controversy is contained in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 33-41 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
and Jefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom are appended. Id. at 63-74.
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process to bar government aid to religious institutions regarded as mostly
Catholic entities.5 ' At the same time, there was a complacent acceptance
of Protestant practices in public life; implicit in the ready characterization
of America as a "Christian nation ' was the idea that the only acceptable
form of Christianity was some version of Protestantism. 6' Of course, this
represented a certain cognitive dissonance within American modernity
but it is the nature of cognitive dissonance to make it possible to live
easily with contradiction. American modernists accepted the de facto
Protestant establishment because it preserved a comfortable and familiar
cultural norm. The stability of this contradiction existed because
American elites were overwhelmingly Protestant, and for practical
reasons, the growing Catholic presence contented itself with keeping its
faith largely out of the public realm. But this was not viable half a
century later, after two world wars, a world-wide economic depression,
and the raw scars of religious hatred in the form of Nazi genocide.
Religious hegemony was exposed as inconsistent with modernity's
values.
Another objection to this explanation is that, if the Court's actions
were based on modernity alone, we might have expected the Court to act
in accordance with the judicial secularism pattern. Judicial secularism
acts to keep the secular and the religious walled off by strict invocation
of the Establishment Clause and by not requiring governments to
accommodate religious conduct so long as such non-accommodation is
not discriminatory toward religion. There is much force to this objection
and this idea will be explored further in connection with judicial
secularism, but for the moment, my concern is to understand why a
modernist Court would simultaneously erect a wall of separation to
enforce the Establishment Clause and require governments to
accommodate religious conduct. In turns out that politics, not
metaphysics, offers the better explanation. The increasing religious
pluralism that eroded and ultimately toppled Protestant hegemony led
the Court by the 1940S to increase protection for religious minorities.
Such cases as Cantwell v. Connecticut,62 in which the Court overturned

59. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 301-05.

6o. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
61. It might not be too much to assert, as a tentative hypothesis, that the popular consciousness of
American modernity in the nineteenth century regarded religion other than the various Protestant
sects as the threat to the Enlightenment metaphysical account. Cf.Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at
298 ("common-school advocates" in the nineteenth century kept "religion in the public schools but
controversy out... by promoting least-common-denominator Protestantism and rejecting
particularistic influences"). Though for very different reasons and in a much different culture, Henry
VIII's sixteenth-century destruction of the established Catholic church and substitution of an Anglican
imitation under the thumb of the Crown may represent a rough analogue to this view of American
modernity in the nineteenth century.
62. 310 U.S. 296, 307 (194o). While the Court stated that "freedom to believe" was "absolute," it
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the breach-of-peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for playing an
anti-Catholic recording on the public streets, and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,6" in which the Court struck down
criminal penalties imposed on Jehovah's Witnesses for their refusal to
salute the flag, illustrate this trend. Minority religions did not pose any
threat of governmental capture, so extending constitutional protection to
the religious conduct of minority religions did not implicate the
Establishment Clause concerns of Everson. Ironically, once the principle
of protecting religious minorities from governmental coercion (as in
Barnette) or of suppressing them (as in Cantwell) took hold, it influenced
the Court's Establishment Clause resolution of school prayer in Engel
and Schempp. Because religious minorities did not threaten to create
forbidden establishments, the Court could act on its burgeoning political
sensitivity to the claims of equality and neutrality and create the other
prong of judicial primacy, however theoretically inconsistent that result
might be with Enlightenment metaphysics.
Thus, the full force of modernity was delayed until the political and
social circumstances of mid-century America permitted modernity to
exercise intellectual suzerainty over the Religion Clauses. Even then,
judicial accommodation of religious minorities tempered modernity's
claims, a bow to the political and social reality of a religious pluralism
that seemed to pose no danger to modernity's essential concern about
religion: government and religion must be cabined into separate
compartments because they offered competing accounts of truth. Should
government intrude upon religion, there was a danger that modernity
would dictate its truth to the faithful; should religion seize government,
there was a danger that religion would impose its truth on the rational
secularists who eschew answers of religious faith. From this came the
Court's view "that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion., 6' American modernity's answer to
the dilemma of the Religion Clauses consisted of squeezing room out of
the constitutional system for legislative discretion to accommodate or
burden religion, thereby producing judicial primacy in mediating the
inherent conflict between the two Religion Clauses.
B.

LEGISLATIVE PRIMACY

The legislative primacy pattern accommodates legislative discretion,
but does not necessarily accommodate religion. This approach largely
noted that "freedom to act" for religious reasons could not, "in the nature of things," be absolute.
According to the Court, the issue of religiously inspired action requires a "weighing of... conflicting
interests," such that government regulation does not "unduly ...infringe the protected freedom" of
religious expression. Id. at 303, 304.
63. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (943).
64. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57: 1

leaves to legislative judgment how many exemptions from generally
applicable conduct regulations, if any, will be afforded to religious
adherents and how much assistance, if any, government will provide to
religious institutions in the course of seeking to achieve legitimate
secular objectives. A notion of government neutrality toward religion
constrains and informs legislative primacy. Two corollary propositions
augment this neutrality principle: governments may not discriminate
against religion (or among religions) and governments must treat religion
equally with secular interests (and must treat all religions equally). The
seeds of legislative primacy may be seen in the more limited principle of
neutrality embraced by the Court in its early Free Exercise cases, such as
Cantwell and Barnette, in which the Court applied its nominally rigid
Establishment Clause approach to state aid to religion, and Zorach v.
Clauson,6 5 in which the Court approved a New York program that

released public school students from mandatory attendance so that they
might receive religious instruction at the church of their choice. In
Zorach, the Court said that "school authorities are neutral ... and do no
more than release students whose parents so request. ''66 Invalidation of
the released time program would require finding "in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.,6 Thus, "government must be neutral when it
comes to competition between sects. 6 8 It may also be the case that the
Free Speech principles of viewpoint and content neutrality bolstered the
development of this notion of government neutrality toward religion. As
governments began to close limited public fora on the basis of religious
expression and sought to justify their selective viewpoint and content69
based closures as necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation,
the Court imported these Free Speech principles into Religion Clauses
jurisprudence.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, the Supreme Court has
65. 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952). But see McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (948),
in which the Court invalidated a release time program that permitted religion teachers of diverse sects,
acting under the approval and supervision of public school officials, to teach their various religions to
consenting elementary school children in their public school classrooms at the end of the day. The
program required non-participating students to attend a study hall.
66. 343 U.S. at 3i.
67. Id. at 314.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, Io6-o7 (2001) (voiding a public
school's refusal to permit a religious group of students and adults to use school facilities after-hours for
religious purposes when those facilities were opened to other similar civic and social organizations);
Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (995) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 277 (i98i) (voiding a university's refusal to permit a religious student group access to a
limited public forum open to all other student groups); see also Spiritualityand Fundamentalism,supra
note 5, at 17.
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steadily proceeded to broaden the scope of legislative discretion to
accommodate or burden religion by continued application of the
neutrality principle, including its corollary propositions. With respect to
the Free Exercise Clause, Employment Division v. Smith" marks the key
development. On grounds of work-related misconduct, Oregon denied
unemployment compensation to two Native-American drug counselors
who were discharged from their employment because they had used
peyote (a banned drug) in sacramental rites of the Native-American
Church. In upholding the denial, the Court returned to such nineteenthcentury precedents as Reynolds v. United States7 and concluded that "the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes). ' '72
A cluster of Establishment Clause cases have more-or-less cemented
in place the principle that the Establishment Clause is not violated when
government "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."73
However, the neutrality principle does not mean that legislatures have
carte blanche to accommodate religious practice. Governments may not,
for example, endorse religious speech as their own,74 delegate
70. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (990).
71. 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (upholding a federal prohibition of polygamy as applied to the then-

prevailing Mormon religious duty to practice polygamy, on the ground that laws "made for the
government of actions," id. at x66, may interfere with religious practices, and that the contrary rule
would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself," id. at 167).
72. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
73. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (i997); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
644 (2002) (upholding a publicly funded tuition voucher plan through which parents of Cleveland
school children could redeem the vouchers at any participating public or private school, even though
most of the schools that chose to participate were religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
8oi (2000) (upholding the loan of instructional hardware and software to public and religious schools
alike to further secular educational goals); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. i, 3 (199o)
(upholding a public school district's payment to a signer for a deaf student enrolled in a religious
school because of the general availability of the benefit to all deaf students); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (upholding a state program granting scholarships to
handicapped students, as applied to a blind student studying for the ministry at a religious college);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983) (upholding a generally available tax credit for educational
expenses that, in practice, was overwhelmingly utilized by parents of children in religious schools);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 68o (1970) (upholding inclusion of church property in a general
scheme of exemption from property taxes for non-profit public benefit corporations).
In Helms, a plurality of the Court stated that "if the government, seeking to further some
legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who
adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has
the effect of furthering that secular purpose." 530 U.S. at 81o.
74. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding that a never-
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governmental power to religious institutions,75 or resolve religious
disputes that arise within religious sects. 6
The development of legislative primacy is also susceptible to
political and metaphysical explanations. Jeffries and Ryan, for example,
contend that "If]or over three hundred years, Baptists and other
Protestants insisted on strict separation of church and state [because
they] shared a vision of church-state relations shaped not only by
implemented school district policy of permitting students to vote to have a student speaker
"solemnize" high school football games was facially invalid as an impermissible endorsement of
religion and a coercion of religious observance); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992)
(invalidating a non-denominational invocation and benediction at a public middle school graduation
ceremony); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (invalidating as furthering only religious
purposes a state law requiring the teaching in public schools of both creation science and evolution if
either theory was taught); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (invalidating as an impermissible
endorsement of religion a state law mandating a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day
"for meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (198o) (invalidating a state
law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, io9 (1968) (invalidating as furthering only religious purposes a state law
forbidding the teaching of evolution); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
(striking down the practice of reading Bible passages in public schools at the beginning of each day);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)

(invalidating

the voluntary recitation of a non-

denominational prayer at the beginning of each day in public schools); cf.Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,770 (1995) (finding that a government could not deny access to a
public forum to a speaker wishing to exhibit a religious symbol-a cross-because the private
exhibition of the cross in a public forum could not reasonably be thought to constitute government
endorsement of the religious message).
75. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (invalidating as an impermissible
"fusion of governmental and religious functions" a state law that created as a separate school district a

village populated entirely by adherents to a single religious sect); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S.
116, 127 (1982) (voiding on the same grounds a state law that gave religious institutions a veto over
liquor licenses sought by applicants located within five hundred feet of a church).
76. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (holding that "whenever the
questions of discipline,.., faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest ...church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept
such decisions as final and.., binding"). The Watson principle was restated and qualified in Gonzales
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, in which the Court stated that in "the absence of fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive." 28o U.S. 1, 16
(1929). This principle was converted into a constitutional rule rooted in free exercise in Kedroff v.St.
Nicholas Cathedraland Kreshik v.St. Nicholas Cathedral. In Kedroff,the Court voided a New York
statute that declared the New York faction of the Russian Orthodox Church autonomous with the
Moscow governing body of that church and thus entitled to use St. Nicholas Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94,
' 19 (1952). The Court stated that the statute "intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the
power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to" the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. In Kreshik, the Court overturned a New York court judgment that transferred control of St.
Nicholas Cathedral from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to the
independent Russian Church of America. 363 U.S. i9o ,191 (196o). The constitutional rule has been
applied ever since. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52
(1969); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 6o9-io (1979) (holding that intra-church disputes may be
constitutionally adjudicated by civil courts if the dispute can be resolved by legal principles neutral as
to religious matters).
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Protestant traditions and principles, but also by mutual self-interest and a
shared suspicion of Roman Catholics."77 However, "mainline Protestant
denominations now take a consistently separationist stance," while
"[e]vangelical Christians take a consistently accommodationist
position.'',8 This schism is noteworthy because "a dramatic shift in energy
and political power from mainline denominations to evangelicals"79 has
occurred. Jeffries and Ryan attribute this shift to declining numbers of
mainline parishioners and a corresponding loss of "political clout,""
coupled with the "explosive growth" of evangelical churches and the
willingness of evangelical Christians to ally "with Catholics and
Orthodox Jews in supporting aid to religious schools." 8' Jeffries and
Ryan attribute this shift in the nature and force of evangelical Christian
political power to the desegregation of public schools and the
banishment of prayer and Bible readings from public schools.2
A metaphysical account may also explain and reinforce this
phenomenon. It should come as no surprise that as modernity matured
and slouched towards the Bethlehem of post-modernism, the number of
adherents to mainline denominations declined. After all, the God-of-thegaps of the mainline denominations provided fewer answers as
modernity's rationality narrowed the gaps in which he operated and
made him increasingly less relevant. Moreover, given the likely
modernist sensibility of most of the mainline adherents, a gradual and
natural disenchantment with God, in any form, was a predictable result.
On the other hand, the decline of modernity and the rise of postmodernism opened "space for radical religious pluralism by denying the
possibility of meta-narratives.''83Evangelical Christians moved into this
vacated space, stepping out of the shadows where they had lurked during
modernity's reign. The irony of post-modernism is that it freed the
medieval account to return in the form of fundamentalism of all kindswhether that of evangelical Christians, ultra-Orthodox Jews, radically
fundamentalist Muslims, or any other brand of religion that offers a
single, universal, exclusive, and infallible account of existence. A postmodernist can choose which account he wishes to accept, but he cannot
say that his chosen account is correct, in the sense of being universally
true. Thus, the fundamentalist account of existence, even if rejected by
post-modernists, cannot be labeled false by a post-modernist.
Post-modernists, however, do not face a choice confined to
77.
78.
79.
8o.
8i.

Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.

Id.

82. Id. at 328-52.
83. Spiritualityand Fundamentalism,supra note 5,at 1207.
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fundamentalism and rationality, or even limited to fundamentalism,
rationality, and agnosticism. As Professor Gedicks correctly observes, a
distinct and separate religion for post-modernists exists."' Gedicks calls it
spirituality, a quest for "revelation of the immanent, rather than the
transcendent ....Spirituality casts religion less as the demand that
believers fit themselves into God's plan, than as the demand of believers
for a fitting God and plan." 58 Spirituality is self-centered, whereas
fundamental Christianity is God-centered. For the fundamental
Christian, man must conform to God's will; his task consists of accepting
and submitting to God's will. For the spiritualist, man must discover his
inner essence and meaning; his task entails coming to know himself and
finding meaning in the voyage of self-discovery. It is no accident that
spirituality is eclectic, combining widely disparate elements in any given
person's spiritual quest. One person may find inner meaning in zen
meditation amidst the redwoods; another person may locate such
meaning in a gospel of empathetic self-improvement; and yet another
may discover personal meaning in aromatherapy and incense. Nor is it
any accident that considerable overlap exists between spirituality and
humanistic psychology. According to such humanists as the Jungians, life
is a process of individuation, in which each person develops a larger and
deeper consciousness that enables him to understand himself profoundly.
Because this insight is related to such ancient eastern religious beliefs as
the seven chakras of Kundalini Yoga, it is not surprising that as the
metaphysical explanations of the western Enlightenment crumble, postmodern spiritualists often combine eastern metaphysics with western
psychology to create an eclectic concoction unified only in its narcissism.
Legislative primacy reacts to these religious developments by
leaving to our elected representatives the primary responsibility of
deciding how to accommodate the stunning diversity of religious
sentiment in a post-modern world. On this account, the practical
justification for the rule of Employment Division v. Smith is the chaos
that would result if every person could claim that his conduct was
presumptively insulated from general rules of law as an expression of his
deeply held quest for self-discovery. The Court decided Reynolds in
1878, when religion was characterized by the relatively simple diversity
of different sects, each claiming to possess the truth. The Reynolds Court
thought that constitutionally required religious exemptions would
"permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Imagine the
anarchy that would result from accommodating the individually tailored
spirituality of post-modernism. Similarly, because the fundamental tenet

84. Id. at 1219.
85. Id.

86. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
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of post-modernism is our inability to find and deliver a universal and true
account of existence, the Court is nudged metaphysically to embrace
neutrality toward religion and its twin corollaries, equality and nondiscrimination. If no account, including the secular, offers universal truth,
the decision of to what extent government may accommodate religion in
the form of aid is inherently contingent and unstable, and there is no
reason to suppose that the Court has any more access to universal truths
than any other post-modern institution. Legislative primacy provides the
answer in the form of deference to legislative judgments about the
appropriate degree of accommodating aid.
However, legislative primacy does not dissolve all the tension
between Free Exercise and Establishment values. Locke v. Davey"'
presented just such a conflict within the context of the legislative primacy
pattern. Washington's Constitution forbids the application of public
funds "to any religious worship, exercise or instruction."" Using criteria
wholly unrelated to religion, Washington provided scholarships to
qualified low income students, but prohibited use of those scholarships to
pursue a degree in theology.s9 The Court upheld the program against a
Free Exercise challenge, reasoning that even though the program was
not "facially neutral with respect to religion," it was not the product of
"hostility toward religion," but was merely a refusal by Washington "to
fund a distinct category of instruction."' Washington did not force
"students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit"9 because they "may still use their scholarship to
pursue a secular degree at a different institution from where they are
studying devotional theology,"" or use the scholarship "to attend
pervasively religious schools"93 at which they could even "take devotional
theology courses,"' so long as they do not seek to obtain a degree in
devotional theology. Though a state could validly decide to fund
religious instruction,95 a state constitutional prohibition of the use of
public funds to support religious instruction was equally within the ambit
of popular discretion, partly because of the long tradition of states

87. 540 U.S. 72, 720-21 (2004).
88. Washington Constitution Article i, section i i provides that "[n]o public money or property
shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment."
89. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715.
90. Id. at 720, 72t.
9 I . Id.
92. Id. at 721 n.4.
93. Id. at 724.
94. Id. at 725.
95. Id. at 719 (stating that "there is no doubt that [Washington] could, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, permit [scholarship recipients] to pursue a degree in devotional theology" (citing Witters
v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986))).
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expressly denying support to the clergy. 6
After Davey, it is apparent that states are free to single out religion
for exclusion from some benefits made available on a secular basis, so
long as the purpose of the exclusion is not to exhibit animosity to
religion. The doctrinal problem consists of identifying which benefits a
state may selectively deny on the basis of religious conduct or belief.
Nothing in Davey suggests that it disturbs the well-settled principle that
states may not deny access to a limited public forum on the basis of the
religious viewpoint of the speaker.' Perhaps Davey will be confined to its
facts, but it may turn out to state the mediating principle for the pattern
of legislative primacy. Judicial primacy tried to mediate the conflict
between the Religion Clauses by seeking to avoid either special religious
benefits or religious burdens. As with legislative primacy, this was a form
of neutrality, but one highly colored by the fear of a union of government
and religion, a fear that dissolved when courts were confronted with
special burdens placed on minority religions. If Davey serves as our
guide, the mediating principle for legislative primacy is whether the
legislature departed from neutrality-meaning equal and nondiscriminatory treatment of religion-by purposefully singling out
religion for disfavored treatment. Because Washington's purpose was
benign-it sought to impose a stronger barrier to the union of church and
state than the federal Constitution requires, but did not totally disable
religion from the benefits of its scholarship program -the Court deferred
to Washington's choice of the level of accommodation it preferred to
deliver.
Of course, judicial deference is not absolute. The principles of
neutrality, equality, and non-discrimination provide an outer barrier to
legislative discretion, as Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah makes clear in the context of the Free Exercise Clause.0 The city
of Hialeah, Florida enacted a series of ordinances proscribing the ritual
slaughter of animals, but riddled with enough exemptions to make the
ordinances applicable in practice almost exclusively to the sacramental
rites of Santerians (a Caribbean religion rooted in African Yoruban
beliefs and much despised in Cuba, the country from which many of the
residents and legislators of Hialeah had emigrated). 99 The Court had little
difficulty voiding the ordinances as violations of Free Exercise because
their object was "suppression of the ...Santeria worship service.""r Both
the purpose and effect of the ordinances violated the principles of
96. Id. at 722-23.
97. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 1o6--o7 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,277 (I98I).
98. 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993).
99. Id.
ioo. Id. at 534.
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neutrality, equality, and non-discrimination.
However, the scope of these principles, especially in the context of
the Establishment Clause, was rendered caliginous as a result of three
cases decided by the Supreme Court in its October 2004 Term, Cutter v.
Wilkinson,'"' McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,"'2 and Van Orden v. Perry."'3 In Cutter, the Court concluded
that section 3 of the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) °4 did not represent on its face a forbidden
establishment of religion.' °5 RLUIPA prohibits governments from
imposing any "substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden imposed
furthers "a compelling governmental interest" and is "the least restrictive
means" of furthering that interest." For purposes of RLUIPA, it does
not matter whether the "religious exercise" at issue is "compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.""' 7 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that RLUIPA constituted an invalid establishment of religion because its
"primary effect is... to advance religion generally by giving religious
prisoners rights superior to those of nonreligious prisoners" and by
''encouraging prisoners to become religious in order to enjoy greater
rights."' °8 The Sixth Circuit distinguished the RLUIPA exemption from
the exemption that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act affords
religious entities (which the Court upheld in Corporationof the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos"° ) on
the ground that the latter exemption was "arguably necessary to avoid"
violating the Establishment Clause."' Without the exemption from Title
VII's bar of religious discrimination in employment, government would
necessarily significantly interfere "with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions ....
RLUIPA, by contrast, lacks such a purpose and delivers quite different
l05.

125 S. Ct. 2113, 2124-25

(2005).

102. 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2746 (2o05).
103. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2o05).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20o0CC-20oOCc-5 (2000).
105. Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124-25.

lo6. 42 U.S.C. § 200occ-I(a) (2000). Because Congress acted under its spending and commerce
powers in enacting RLUIPA, it does not face the same constitutional difficulties attendant to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2ooobb-2ooobb- 4 (2ooo), which the Court voided as
to the states because it was not a remedial statute within the limits of Congress's power to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.See City of Boerne v.Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 53235 997).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
Io8. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F. 3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 2003).
109. 483 U.S. 327,339 (1987).
'to. 349 F.3d at 263.
iii. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654 (2000), it is also
nearly certain that imposition of a requirement that religious entities refrain from discriminating on
the basis of religion in employment would violate the right of free association.
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effects." 2 The Sixth Circuit thought that RLUIPA sought to privilege
religious conduct and resulted in the protection of religious conduct." 3
The proof of this effect, according to the court of appeals, was twofold:
(i) Identical conduct lacking an element of religious expression goes
unprotected, and (2) RLUIPA protects religious conduct without any
indication that religious conduct has been unfairly singled out for
unfavorable treatment.'

None of this mattered to the Supreme Court. The Court
unanimously held that section 3 constituted "a permissible legislative
accommodation
of religion."".5 RLUIPA did not "elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to
maintain order and safety" or "override other significant interests,"
whether of government or non-believers." 6 Section 3 did not facially
"differentiate among bona fide faiths.... It confer[red] no privileged
status on any particular religious sect, and single[d] out no bona fide faith
for disadvantageous treatment. ''" 7 Nor did the Court attribute any
significance to the fact that only religious believers benefitted from
section 3 . "8Relying on Amos, the Court concluded that accommodations
of religion "need not 'come packaged with benefits to secular entities,"'
because any other conclusion would cause "all manner of religious
accommodations [to] fall."".9
Cutter represents a mirror image of Davey, at least with respect to
the scope of legislative primacy. By upholding RLUIPA against a facial
challenge, Cutter has extended legislative primacy to permit governments
to prefer religion, just as Davey permitted governments to burden
religion. The "play in the joints" between the two Religion Clauses has
become greater and, depending on the resolution of the as-applied
challenges to RLUIPA that may come in the wake of Cutter, judicial
control of the actual manifestation of that play may wither a bit further.
Indeed, the Court in Cutter provided a broad hint that further challenges
to the application of RLUIPA, at least in prison settings, are not likely to
prove fruitful.' ° According to the Court, Congress intended that
RLUIPA's strict scrutiny standard be applied with "'due deference to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security

Cutter,349 F.3d at 263.
113. Id.
I14. Id.
115. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct.
ii6. 1d. at 2122.
117. Id. at 2123.
118. Id. at2124.
II9. Id.
120. See id. at 2123.
112.

2113, 2121 (2005).
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and discipline .....
. Perhaps courts will exhibit less deference to
government administrators in other settings. We shall see. If Cutter is
taken to mean that courts should generally defer to government
administrators, the case takes legislative primacy to a new level. Not only
may Congress set the boundaries of religious accommodation, but the
actual degree of accommodation will be left to bureaucrats, subject to
correction by new legislation and not by courts. If courts defer only to
prison administrators (out of security concerns) and not to other
government administrators, the courts will simply enforce through strict
scrutiny a legislatively directed heightened accommodation of religion.
Thus, regardless of the degree of deference, the result of Cutter is
enhanced legislative primacy.
Given their starkly different results and rationales, Van Orden and
McCreary County raise additional questions of how much play the joint
of the Religion Clauses can withstand without dislocation. In Van Orden,
the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court judgment that the display of a sixfoot-tall granite monument bearing a "nonsectarian version" of the Ten
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas capitol did not violate the
Establishment Clause.' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "Ten
Commandments have both a religious and secular message," and
identified the secular message, as did the Texas legislature, "as a
common code of conduct.' ' .3 Because of the dual nature of the Ten
Commandments, the court examined the "context of the display," and, as
in Lynch v. Donnelly'24 and Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Greater Pittsburgh, 5 concluded that the inclusion of the
monument along with sixteen other monuments celebrating "'ideals and
events that compose Texan identity"' effectively negated any inference
that Texas endorsed the religious message of the Ten Commandments."'
The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning. A plurality of four, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, thought that Lemon was inapposite
I21. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 103-Ii, at IO (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899,
19oo).
122. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 18o (5th Cir. 2003). There are three different versions of
the Ten Commandments contained in the Bible. Compare Exodus 20:2-17, Exodus 34:12-26, and
Deuteronomy 5:6-21. Moreover, versions differ among Jews, Catholics, and Protestants, and among
the various Protestant sects. See generally ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES: A TRANSLATION
WITH COMMENTARY (2004).

123. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 179, 18o.
124. 465 U.S. 668, 68o-8i (1984) (finding that inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's annual
Christmas display was not a purposeful effort to advocate a particular religious message and did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
125. 492 U.S. 573, 620-22 (1989) (finding the unadorned display of a creche in a courthouse to be
an Establishment Clause violation, but upholding the display of a menorah, accompanied by a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty).
126. Van Orden, 351 F. 3 d at 18o, 181 (quoting H.R. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2001)).
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and relied instead on a long and unbroken tradition of official
acknowledgment of religion that supported the validity of the display.'"
The fact that the monument was a passive display, situated in a context
of secular historical monuments, also served to render unlikely the
possibility that a reasonable observer would see in it a governmental
endorsement of religion."' Justice Breyer supplied the crucial fifth vote,
via his opinion concurring in the judgment. Breyer agreed with the
plurality that neither Lemon nor any other test was adequate to meet the
decisional task:
I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment. That
judgment is not a personal judgment. Rather... it must reflect ... the
underlying purposes of the Clauses, and it must take account of context
and consequences measured in light of those purposes. While the
Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts... no exact formula can
dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.2 9
Justice Breyer tossed these factors into the decisional hopper, turned
the lever, and out came his considered judgment that the monument's
location, provenance, and uncontroversial forty-year history conveyed a
message sufficiently diluted to pass constitutional scrutiny. Of lesser
significance to Breyer was the fear that a contrary decision would
"exhibit a hostility toward religion that ....might well encourage
disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten
Commandments from public buildings across the Nation.... [and]
thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the
3 °
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.',
In McCreary County, the Supreme Court reached the opposite
conclusion with respect to the display of the Ten Commandments in
Kentucky courthouses as part of a larger display of secular historical
documents. The Sixth Circuit had upheld a preliminary injunction of the
display on the grounds that it lacked a secular purpose and conveyed an
endorsement of the religious message of the Ten Commandments.' 3 ' The
Court concluded that the history of the event-a progression from a
127. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) ("[O]ur analysis is driven both by the nature
of the monument and by our Nation's history.... 'There is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at
least 1789."' (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,674 (1984))).
i28. Id. at 2864.
129. Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 2871 (citation omitted).
131. ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3 d 438, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2003) (the "displays
consisted of the entire Star Spangled Banner, the Declaration of Independence, the Mayflower
Compact, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky
Constitution, an excerpt of the Congressional Record containing the Ten Commandments, [a]
Kentucky statute regarding the posting of historical displays and a School Board Resolution" asserting
that the displayed "documents positively contribute to the educational foundations and moral
character of students" (footnote omitted)).
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display of the Commandments alone, to a display that placed the
Commandments among American historical documents edited to
highlight their religious sentiments, to a final display in which the
Commandments were exhibited along with the full text of legal and
historical documents such as Magna Carta and the Declaration of
Independence-belied an overwhelmingly religious purpose behind the
display.'32 The McCreary County majority applied Lemon but added two
elements to its purpose prong.'33 First, the majority divined purpose
primarily from the perception of the reasonable observer.'34 Second, the
Court declared that while Lemon required only the existence of a
genuine secular purpose, the secular purpose must predominate and not
be "merely secondary to a religious objective. '
Central to the reasoning of the McCreary County majority and to
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden was the notion of neutrality,
both as among religions and as between religion and disbelief. Indeed,
the Van Orden plurality also endorsed neutrality when it declared that
the "Januslike" quality of the Establishment Clause "requires that we
neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between church
and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the government
from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage.' ', 6 Of course,
neutrality is a value pitched at a high level of generality; in the
application of this principle, the Court fractured badly. Van Orden and
McCreary leave us with the vague and uncertain conclusion that when
governments display religious imagery, on the one hand, their display
will be forbidden when the context suggests to the mythical reasonable
observer that the government's secular purpose is not the dominant
purpose. On the other hand, no constitutional infirmity exists when the
display is consistent with our past cultural practices, has been
uncontroversial for a number of years, and exists in a context that "has a
dual significance, partaking of both religion and government."'37 It is
noteworthy that five justices united in Van Orden to jettison reliance
upon the usual Establishment Clause tests, and that five justices united in
McCreary County to apply Lemon and, indeed, tweaked Lemon's
purpose prong to include the core of the endorsement test.
This presents even more of a "split double header" than the Grutter
and Gratz duo.' We know that half the Court maintains a deep

132.

Id.

133. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735 (2005).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2859 (2005).

137. Id. at 2864.
138. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally id. and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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commitment to legislative primacy, even when the subject is the volatile
matter of governmental delivery of religious imagery or messages. In
addition, half the Court maintains an equally deep commitment to
opposition to that principle, at least when governments display religious
messages. On the other hand, the entire Court unites in recognizing
legislative primacy when it comes to tangible accommodation of religious
conduct through RLUIPA. This is a very mixed message. We are left
with the conclusion that a fair amount of legislative primacy will be
countenanced, even when it comes to governmental display of religious
imagery, but we are much less certain exactly when the Court will assert
its check on this power. The frank admission by Justice Breyer-the
Powell-in-Bakke of the Ten Commandments-that these cases turn on
their facts and the application of "legal judgment" but no formulaic tests,
does not augur much predictability in this area. It harkens back to the
Redrup39 era in obscenity law when the Court summarily affirmed or
denied obscenity convictions whenever five members of the Court,
applying their separate notions of obscenity, "knew it when they saw
it." 40 Sometimes they will see impermissible religious purpose; other
times they will see acknowledgment of heritage in a fashion by which the
secular and the religious are amalgamated. The very fact of such
uncertainty will spur legislatures to experiment with such displays; the
increase in such experimentation will produce a de facto trend toward
enhanced legislative primacy.
C.

JUDICIAL SECULARISM

This pattern may exist only in theory. It stems from the view,
exemplified by the Everson dissenters, that the Religion Clauses aspire
to secure religious liberty by strictly separating religion and government.
The Establishment Clause offers the principal mechanism for doing so,
because it most acutely addresses the union of government and religion.
On this view, the Free Exercise Clause functions to ensure that
government does not depart from strict abstention from religion by
imposing undue burdens on religious belief or practice, but does compel
very much accommodation of religious conduct. Years ago, Philip
Kurland summed it up by arguing that the Religion Clauses state "a
single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for
action or inaction because [the clauses] prohibit classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.''. Of course, as
Professor Kurland recognized, this is merely "a starting point... , not a
mechanical answer"; had Professor Kurland held the power of the Court,
139. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767,769-70 (1967).
140. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (of obscenity, "I
know it when I see it").
141. Kurland, supra note 16, at 96.
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he may not have applied it to produce judicial secularism.'42
If this pattern existed at all in the Supreme Court, it would be seen
in the period that runs roughly from the Mormon cases in the latter
decades of the nineteenth century through 196i, the year in which the
Court decided McGowan v. Maryland'43 and Braunfeld v. Brown.'"4 The
operative word, however, is "if." While this period has elements of
judicial secularism, in that it displays a clear tilt toward allowing
legislatures extraordinary latitude to burden religion without running
afoul of the Free Exercise Clause and shows somewhat more willingness
to exert judicial control over the legislative accommodations that
arguably offend the Establishment Clause, it does not represent a clear
exemplar of judicial secularism. Judicial secularism may never have
manifested itself strongly enough to place its distinctive stamp on the
Court's Religion Clauses jurisprudence.
Reynolds, the first of the Mormon cases, which upheld the
application of a federal statute making polygamy a crime to a Mormon
bigamist who was following the religious duty of his church, was decided
amid widely-held "hostility to Mormonism [resulting from] the practice
of polygamy [and] the notion that [the Mormon hierarchy] constituted ' 45
a
secret and tyrannical [threat] to the genius of democratic institutions.'
The Court unanimously concluded that while "Congress was deprived of
all legislative power over mere [religious] opinion," it remained "free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order.' '1 46 The action-belief distinction is untenable, of course, for
some religious actions are so entwined with belief that they cannot be
separated. Although Reynolds spoke in terms of a distinction between
protected belief and unprotected conduct, it actually did little more than
recite the same principle more artfully declared by Employment Division
v. Smith. 47 As Professor Kurland put it, "the
wrong motivation does not
'4
rob the decision of its essential soundness. '
Davis v. Beason, however, was another matter. 4 An Idaho
territorial statute required, as a precondition for voting, that a voter
swear that he was "not a member" of any body that encourages
polygamy "as a duty arising or resulting from membership" in such a
body, "or which practises bigamy, polygamy or plural or celestial
'

142. Id.
143. 366 U.S. 420 (i96i).
144. 366 U.S. 599 (i96i).
145. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 699 ( 3 d ed. 1903).

146. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
147. 494 U.S. 872 (i98o).

148. Kurland, supra note 16, at 7-8.
149. 133 U.S. 333,342 (189o).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 57:1i

marriage as a doctrinal rite.' 5 Davis, a Mormon who was convicted of
falsely so swearing, appealed on the ground that the law denied him the
free exercise of his religion.' 5 The Court upheld the law in an opinion
that did not even discuss the fact that the statute imposed a legal
disability couched in terms of belief, not action.'52 Instead, the Court
asserted that it "was never intended or supposed that the [Religion
Clauses] could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the
punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of
society."' 53 And that was that. By I96i, when the Court in Braunfeld
upheld a Sunday closing law against a free exercise challenge brought by
an Orthodox Jew, judicial control of legislative discretion to
accommodate or burden religious expression was not much greater. A
four justice plurality said that the Sunday closing law did "not make
unlawful any religious practices"; it merely made "the practice of...
religious beliefs more expensive."'54 The plurality declared that to strike
down "legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice
itself[] would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."'55
McGowan, decided the same term as Braunfeld, upheld the validity of a
Sunday closing law against an Establishment challenge, reasoning that
Sunday closing laws furthered the secular purpose of mandating a
"common day of rest.., which most persons would select of their own
accord."'i
McGowan and Braunfeld, taken together, suggest a legislative
primacy pattern at work on the issue of Sunday closing laws, but
Everson, the most important Establishment Clause decision of this
period, suggests in its analysis, if not its result, a more robust view of the
Establishment Clause. Though the majority emphatically stated that no
government "can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another," or levy a "tax in any amount... to
support any religious activities or institutions," the Court concluded that
New Jersey's payment of the costs of transporting children to parochial
schools was permissible because it served as "part of a general program
under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools."'57 While this rationale is the seed from which contemporary
legislative primacy has grown, the Everson dissenters would never have
planted it. To Justice Jackson, the "prohibition against establishment of

150.
i51.
152.
153.

Id. at 334.

Id.
Id. at 342.
Id.
154. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,605 (i96i).

155. Id. at 6o6.

156. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (i96i).
157. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15-7 (947).
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religion cannot be circumvented by a subsidy, bonus or reimbursement
of expense to individuals for receiving religious instruction and
indoctrination.' ' I, To Justice Rutledge, writing for all four dissenters, the
establishment "prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or
other, of religion in any guise, form or degree."' 59 Like Pickett's Charge,
the high water mark of judicial secularism may have crested just shy of
success, and while the Establishment Clause principles championed by
the Everson dissenters have partially succeeded in later years, those
evidence
successes mostly came after Sherbert and thus provide better
6
,
for the judicial primacy pattern than for judicial secularism.
A mild puzzle that surfaces is why judicial secularism never took
root. Politically, the 1940s and early 1950s might have seemed a
propitious time for its development. As Jeffries and Ryan note, the
Everson result "sparked alarm" among Protestants, who "issued dire
warnin s about Catholic inroads on the separation of church and
state."' They were not alone. "Believing that Jewish freedom depended
on a secular society, Jewish groups were even more adamant than
Protestants in demanding separation of church and state. ' ' 62 Both groups
"aligned themselves with public secularists of all persuasions.' ', 6, While
this movement did result in the school prayer decisions, and a
concomitant commitment in late mid-century America to erase religion
as a substantial foundation for public culture, it never blossomed into
true judicial secularism. Perhaps the American impulse for equal
treatment checked judicial secularism, for as the commitment to a
stronger establishment guarantee gained force, so did the Court's
willingness to expand judicial protection for religious conduct. Judicial
primacy was the result.
Similarly, if mid-twentieth-century America (or at least its elite
cadre of policy-makers) were staunchly modernist, one might have
expected judicial secularism to receive a warmer reception than actually
had occurred. Perhaps this suggests that America was not so modern as
we suppose, but it may also reflect the fact that Enlightenment values in
America almost always came filtered through an assumption of
America's cultural Protestantism.'6 4 But when that assumption broke
'

158. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
16o. Engel and Schempp, the school prayer and Bible reading cases, were decided in 1962 and
1963, respectively. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223 (1963). Sherbert was also decided in 1963. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). It was
not until 1971 that Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (i97i), was decided, thus producing the
test under which most Establishment Clause violations since then have been detected.
i6I. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 315.
162. Id. at 316.
163. Id. at317.
164. That assumption may be seen most clearly in Reynolds and Beason, the Mormon polygamy
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down in the 194os, the dominant Enlightenment impulse sought equality
and non-discrimination rather than a strict version of neutrality. If so,
that impulse accounts for the fact that the Court added judicial
protection of free exercise at the very moment it began to enforce the
Establishment Clause vigorously. On this reading, judicial secularism
never had a chance in the peculiarly American version of modernism.
Only in some other culture, more thoroughly committed to modernism's
rationality and more deeply suspicious of religion as a competitor for the
pursuit of truth, could judicial secularism have thrived. But that was not
America.
D.

JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION

This pattern may be developing, but it has not yet arrived. The Free
Exercise prong of judicial accommodation would manifest itself in a
reversal of Employment Division v. Smith and adoption of a more
broadly applicable version of Sherbert. Manifest congressional desire
exists to adopt this view of the Free Exercise Clause, as enactment of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act indicate. But RFRA fell victim to the
Court's view of Congress's power to enforce the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment and, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, RLUIPA was
upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge to its validity.'6 5 Cutter
does not mean that the Court has embraced the Free Exercise prong of
judicial accommodation; rather, it merely suggests the Court's willingness
to extend the reach of the legislative primacy pattern.' 66 On the other
hand, as the earlier discussion of legislative primacy has indicated, the
Court has given ample evidence of its willingness to relax its
Establishment
Clause
scrutiny and thus permit legislative
accommodation of religion.
Given the 5-4 division of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
on the question of whether, in essence, the Court should apply the
Reynolds or Sherbert test, it is entirely possible that the Court could
reverse direction, jettison Smith, and embrace Sherbert once again. With
no other change in current Religion Clauses doctrine, this move would
cases. In Reynolds, the Court indulged in xenophobia by noting that "[p]olygamy has always been
odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the
Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (878). In Beason, the Court asserted that "bigamy and
polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries.... [because they] tend to
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to
debase man. Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society, and receive more general
or more deserved punishment. To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to
shock the moral judgment of the community." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (189o).
165. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2124-25 (2005).

166. See id.
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shift the Court from legislative primacy to judicial accommodation. Such
a move would be especially pronounced if the Court applied Sherbert
strict scrutiny with the strictness with which it has traditionally been
applied.*
There are a number of political factors that suggest legislative
primacy may evolve into judicial accommodation. Advocates of
government assistance to religion, particularly in the context of
education, are no longer conservative Catholics alone, but now include68
evangelical Christians, very Orthodox Jews, and African Americans.'
Even public secularists have moderated their opposition to government
assistance to religious schools, because many of the secularists have lost
faith in public education and are willing to embrace voucher programs
that include religious schools among the eligible recipients.' 69 While I do
not claim a causal relationship between these emergent political forces
and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,the result of the case surely accords with
these political sentiments.'7 °
The cultural shift toward post-modernism both bolsters and hinders
the prospects for judicial accommodation. As the dominant metaphysical
understanding becomes ever more post-modernist, religious beliefs
become just another contingent assertion, no better or worse than any
other, because no explanation of existence can confidently be asserted as
universally true. But because post-modernism does not deny the
necessity of choice, even if we lack confidence in the abiding truth of our
choices, there is no theoretical barrier to a thoroughly post-modern
Court choosing to permit legislatures to burden religious conduct of all
kinds, so long as they do so by laws of general applicability that do not
single out religious conduct for special disabilities. Moreover, the
emergence of self-regarding spirituality as a distinctively post-modern
religion makes rejection of the Employment Division v. Smith rule highly
impractical. The appeal of post-modernist spirituality is that it helps
individuals "to understand and discover themselves in the midst of the
demands of their everyday life, rather than whether its teachings and
doctrines conform to an external and ultimate divine reality..'' 7 '
Application of the Sherbert test in a post-modern world of religious
pluralism would produce unworkable results, for the shoe of government

167. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (where the Court applied strict
scrutiny in upholding race as a factor in university admissions, and declared that it would presume the
good faith of university officials in using race as a factor, despite statistical evidence that tended to
show race as a powerful and possibly determinative factor). See also Calvin Massey, The New
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004).

s68. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 2, at 358-61.
169. Id. at 362-65.
170. 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
171. Spirituality and Fundamentalism,supra note 5,at 1218.
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would pinch someone's spiritual foot every time it was laced up. On the
other hand, the same pluralist and post-modern forces suggest that a
rigid exclusion of all the many varieties of religious experience from
government assistance would compromise the principles of neutrality,
equality, and non-discrimination, at least when such assistance is made
generally available to secular institutions. The prognosis for judicial
accommodation is not promising; legislative primacy may be the
dominant pattern for some time to come. What are the implications of
this development?
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE PRIMACY:

A POLITICAL MARKETPLACE OF RELIGIONS
The legislative primacy position serves to convert the intersection of
religion and government into a marketplace, but one in which the
medium of exchange is political clout. The purpose of this Part of this
Article is to assess whether the marketplace approach to adjustment of
the relationship of government and religion is either workable
constitutional law or desirable public policy. In order to do so, we must
first canvass the marketplace effects of the legislative primacy approach
in greater detail.
Markets exist, by and large, because they fulfill basic human needs
for the exchange of goods and services. Their efficient functioning
depends upon the independent, fully informed decisions of a host of
private actors. Economic theory holds that in such perfectly competitive
markets the relative supply of and demand for any given good or service
will produce an equilibrium price at which the product will be exchanged
in sufficient volume to exhaust both supply and demand.'72 However, the
market created by the legislative primacy pattern of the Religion Clauses
is of a very different character.
Legislative primacy, as its name suggests, invests the legislatures of
the nation with enormous discretion to confer benefits or impose
burdens on religion. This power is, of course, not unbounded. As we
observed earlier, governments may not impose burdens on religious
conduct designed to fall upon r. ligious conduct alone, nor may
governments coerce or endorse religious conduct or belief or provide aid
to religion on a basis that prefers religious to secular institutions or that
172. Numerous qualifications and assumptions exist that must be supplied to make this description
of economic theory accurate. To mention only a very few, marketplace actors must be sufficiently
numerous to deprive any one actor or group of actors from wielding monopoly or monopsony power;
these actors must be accurately and thoroughly informed about the products and other conditions
affecting supply and demand; and we must assume the non-existence of other goods or services that
may be substituted for the given good or service. This footnote would assume treatise dimensions if I
continued with a complete explanation of all the variables and factors that affect economic
conceptions of market behavior.
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prefers one religion to others. Yet, within these constraints legislatures
are free to do pretty much what they please with respect to
accommodation of or assistance to religion. This is not a competitive
market. The legislature holds monopoly power, but unlike the usual
monopolist, the legislature is politically accountable to the people. The
result is a political marketplace in which private actors compete with one
another to curry legislative favor in one form or another, and
simultaneously seek to influence the legislature through ballot-box
accountability. The private actors in this political marketplace are not
likely to be exclusively religious institutions or persons of religious faith;
it is just as probable that public secularists-private persons and affinity
groups who care deeply about preventing a blending of state power and
religious faith-will participate in this arena.
The creation of a political marketplace of religion will affect the
behavior of governments and the various private actors that seek to
influence governmental decision-making about the role of religion in
public life, or the role of public life in religion. Behavioral effects are not
the only effects, however, that the political marketplace will produce.
The advent of a vigorous political marketplace of religion will likely
affect the future development of the constitutional doctrines that,
ironically, created the political marketplace. The nature of such doctrinal
change is a bit speculative; thus, I confine my speculations to those based
on the doctrinal strands that already exist as buttresses for either end of
the spectrum defining the legislative primacy pattern. I first examine the
probable behavioral effects of the political marketplace of religion and
then the likely doctrinal effects.
A.

BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE OF RELIGIONS

Religious institutions and many ordinary citizens are likely to react
to the political marketplace outcome by engaging in aggressive rentseeking. Such rent-seeking will indirectly result in the delivery of greater
rewards to those religions that successfully proselytize. This effect, in
turn, will likely lead to a heightened level of public debate and, perhaps,
controversy concerning the role of religion in public life and the role of
public institutions in religion. Each of these phenomena will be discussed
below.
I. Rent-seeking Behavior
A staple observation of economists and public choice theorists is
that people will engage in rent-seeking behavior whenever there is an
opportunity to do so. In private bargaining, this usually takes the form of
two parties, each seeking to extract the maximum premium theoretically
available from any given exchange of rights. The holdout problem
presents a classic example. Assume a real estate developer has acquired
ownership of all the fee titles that compose a city block, save one.
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Assume that his profit from the development (provided that it does not
include the holdout's property), reduced to its present value, totals $5
million. Assume that the developer's profit, including the final parcel,
reduced to present value, totals $io million. Assume further that the fair
market value of the holdout's property, considered in isolation without
regard to the proposed development, amounts to $I million. The possible
gains from trade, or the "rents" available to be captured, total $4 million,
represented by the difference between the marginal increase in the
present value of the developer's profit with the holdout's parcel included
and the fair market value of that parcel, considered without reference to
the development. (Assume also that there are no other possible
developers.) Of course, if each of these parties knows these facts, they
will squabble over the division of the gain: The holdout will want to
obtain a price as close to $5 million as he can, and the developer will
desire to pay little more than $i million. Each party will expend energy
(and possibly money) on negotiations designed to capture the largest
possible portion of the available surplus. The outcome of this bilateral
rent-seeking is indeterminate, for any number of factors exogenous to
this bare-bones analysis may influence the result.
In the public sphere, similar behavior is apt to occur, but the gains
come in a different currency. Individuals and interest groups seek to
obtain governmental largesse in many different forms: regulations
favorable to the supplicant (or detrimental to the supplicant's rivals),
assistance (whether financial or in-kind) to the supplicant's mission, or
simply the absence of regulation and restriction from government. Public
rent-seeking is also apt to involve large numbers of parties.'73 First, if the
legislature is the only governmental unit that is capable of dispensing
such favors, it enjoys monopoly power, but it exercises its power with at
least one eye on the next election, thus making the legislative monopolist
theoretically responsive to the dominant sentiment motivating the
electorate to vote in a particular manner. Second, the number of persons
and interest groups that might seek to obtain favors from the legislature
probably exceeds the size of the polity itself, given the multiplicity of
interests each person possesses.
173. Private rent-seeking can also, of course, involve large numbers. Assume that fifty businesses
are concentrated geographically into a compact unit and that each emits noxious air pollution in
varying amounts. Assume that downwind of these polluters live one hundred property owners and that
no other people are affected by the pollution, thus permitting the assumption that no other negative
external costs exist in association with the pollution. If the present value of the collective gains from
continued pollution totals $too million and the collective present fair market value of the Ioo affected
properties totals $io million (calculated excluding reduction for the pollution and including the costs
of relocation imposed on each of the property owners by a sale of their property), everyone concerned
will be better off if the polluters pay in excess of $to million to the property owners in order to acquire
their properties. The collective action problems posed to realization of this outcome, though, are
significant- free-riders and holdouts.
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As a likely effect of these conditions, each organized sect will seek to
obtain public benefits. The probable result consists of two forms of rentseeking. First, given the finite nature of the public pie, each sect will seek
to maximize its share of the benefits, financial and otherwise, that
government may permissibly bestow. Second, each sect will seek specific
advantages from governments, relative to other sects, either in the form
of preferences or disabilities imposed on other sects for ostensibly
religiously neutral reasons.
The struggle for a disproportionate share of affirmative public
benefits manifests itself most clearly when the public purse is opened to
religious aid. Thus, when the Court upheld the validity of school
vouchers redeemable at religious schools in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,"4
it did so over the objections of the dissenters that the result would "tap
sectarian religion's capacity for discord. 'Public money devoted to
payment of religious costs.., brings the quest for more [and] the
struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any..''. It would

be naive to think that this contest will be fought on the basis of pure
relative desert. To be sure, each sect will likely claim that its public
service, whether it be education, drug counseling, welfare assistance, or
something else, provides a better and more effective tool for achieving
desired secular aims than that provided by their competitors. Some
verifiable truth may dwell in such assertions, but it is equally likely that
each sect will seek the termination or diminution of aid to one or more of
their rival sects based on the incompatibility of the religious tenets of the
rival sects with important secular objectives. As Justice Souter charged in
his dissent in Zelman, "[rieligious teaching at taxpayer expense simply
cannot be cordoned from taxpayer politics, and every major religion
currently espouses social positions that provoke intense opposition.'

76

It

is simply not realistic to expect deeply conservative fundamental
Protestants to "underwrite the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church
condemning the death penalty,' '

77

or to expect Muslims willingly to pay

"for the endorsement of the religious Zionism taught in many religious
Jewish schools.' '

7
7

Even less realistic is to expect secular Americans

blithely to pay for "Muslim views on the differential treatment of the
Baptist view "of a wife's obligation of obedience
sexes" or the Southern
79
to her husband.'

The struggle for money will inevitably encompass the second form of
174. 536 U.S. 639,

644 (2002).

175. 536 U.S. 639, 715 (20O2) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I,
53 (I947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
176. Id. at 715-16.
177. Id. at 716.
t78. Id.
179. Id.
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benefit-seeking: imposition of disadvantages upon other sects for
ostensibly religiously neutral reasons. Little imagination is necessary to
conjure up the scene in some legislative committee when a secularist
proposes to exclude schools that discriminate against women or sexual
minorities from participation in a school voucher program, or conversely,
when a fundamentalist proposes that school vouchers should not be
redeemable at schools that employ homosexuals as teachers. Examples
could continue, but I am confident that my readers possess sufficiently
vivid imaginations to envision the seemingly endless possibilities of this
sort. Nor will this contest be confined to simple exclusion of rival sects
from public financial benefits. An equally probable result is that
governments will attach conditions to the receipt of aid that will pinch
religious expression. After all, the rationale for inclusion of religious
institutions in aid programs generally available to secular and religious8
recipients alike is that such aid programs further secular objectives.' ,
With the pursuit of secular ends comes the attachment of secular values
to the aid designed to achieve those ends. A prohibition of religious
discrimination by aid recipients, which the Cleveland voucher program in
Zelman mandated, has the strong potential to interfere with religious
values. ' However, if the operative pattern remains legislative primacy,
this may well be seen as unobjectionable, a mere application of Davey, or
the obverse of Amos. If so, Justice Souter's predictive jeremiad in
Zelman may well come to pass: "When government aid goes up, so does
reliance on it; the only thing likely to go down is independence.... A day
will come when religious schools will learn what political leverage can

do.",182

The struggle for relative advantage and preference will not be
confined to the public treasury. In the name of non-discrimination and
equality, religious adherents will seek access to public facilities for
religious purposes-access that can hardly be denied.'8' However, in his
dissent in Widmar v. Vincent, Justice White argued that a distinction
should be drawn between religious worship and other religious speech,

I8o. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2oo2).
181. See id.
182. Id. at 715.
183. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, io6-o7 (2ooi) (voiding a public

school's refusal to permit a religious group of students and adults to use school facilities after-hours for
religious purposes when those facilities were opened to other similar civic and social organizations);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,395 (0993) (finding impermissible
viewpoint discrimination in public school's closure of its facilities to religious purposes when opened
for other public purposes); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-49 (99o) (upholding-and
rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to-the federal Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4o7i4074, which requires public schools that make their facilities a limited public forum to open them to
religious speech); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (i98I) (voiding a university's refusal to permit
a religious student group access to a limited public forum open to all other student groups).
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and that governments may discriminate against religious worship without
violating either the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses.'" While this
argument was rejected by the Widmar majority as "novel," premised on
an unintelligible distinction between worship and other religious speech,
and nearly impossible to administer,' it surfaced again in the dissents in
Good News Club v. Milford CentralSchool.'" Justice Stevens argued that
a distinction can and should be made between speech with a "religious
viewpoint, on the one hand, [and] religious proselytizing" on the other
hand.' sT Justice Souter agreed, calling the speech at issue "an evangelical
service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of
Christian conversion."'8 The distinction made by White, Stevens, and
Souter is untenable in a post-modern world characterized by legislative
primacy. Religious worship may qualify as a distinct form of speech when
traditional pre-modern religious faith is expressed, although even then
the line between worship and other religious speech will be thin and
wavering at the margin, but the line entirely disappears when postmodern spirituality is at issue. How does one worship in the creed of selfdiscovery? While some find traditional worship personally meaningful,
others find a stroll among the redwoods on the spine of Point Reyes
equally meaningful. The task of labeling worship is Herculean and quite
possibly incoherent.
Religious adherents of the sort that Professor Gedicks calls
fundamentalists' 89 will seek to obtain the public display of religious texts
or symbols, either unadorned, as in Stone v. Graham1" and Glassroth v.
Moore (Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore's display of the Ten
Commandments in the rotunda of the state's supreme court), 9' or in
combination with secular texts and symbols. 9 ' It is much less likely that
post-modern spiritualists will seek the same benefits because it is the
nature of spirituality to lack distinctive emblems and symbols indelibly
associated with religion. For example, the yin-yang symbol, while
184. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 282-87 (White, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 269-7o n.6.
186. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 134-45 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
187. Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. Spirituality and Fundamentalism,supra note 5, at 1223-24 ("Fundamentalism is everything
that spirituality is not. The fundamentalist truth is hard, literal, and exclusive, what God has plainly
revealed ....Fundamentalism presupposes a single, transcendent reality which does not change, and
to which believers must consequently accommodate themselves ....).
19o. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (198o) (display of Ten Commandments alone in public
school classrooms).
191. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1318-19 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (ordering monument
removed), aff'd, 335 F.3 d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1ooo (2003).
192. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125
S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1

associated with the I Ching and possibly of some personal meaning to
many post-modern spiritualists as a symbol of the duality of existence, is
hardly likely to inspire such feeling that spiritualists would seek its
display as an aspect of government-sponsored public culture. Only the
traditional religious symbols, those born into a pre-modern religious
culture and cherished now by those who cling to this religious sensibility,
are likely to be thrust into the public sphere. The question posed for
Religion Clauses doctrine asks whether it will draw the legislative
primacy line at the incorporation of religious symbols into public culture,
especially those that convey the fundamentalist message of exclusive
truth. While religious fundamentalism sends a message that is
incompatible with post-modernist beliefs and directly competes with the
Enlightenment paradigm, that paradigm is collapsing. The question is
whether it has so collapsed that we are no longer able to see much of a
difference between the symbols of pre-modern religion and the secular,
particularly when the two are fused. The answer supplied by the Court's
decisions in McCreary County and Van Orden is inconclusive. The
McCreary majority evidences a passionate neo-Enlightenment sensibility
coupled with tinges of post-modern value skepticism. The Van Orden
plurality accommodates fundamentalist values, and Justice Breyer
represents the thoroughly post-modern Millie in the middle.
Finally, it is not implausible to suppose that religious groups and
public secularists will seek to impose a wide variety of disabilities on
religious sects for ostensibly religiously neutral reasons. As discussed,
some of this inevitably attends the structuring of government aid that is
generally available to religious and secular entities for the purpose of
attaining secular objectives, but this gambit will probably not be
restricted simply to aid programs. Legislative primacy suggests that
governments may legitimately refuse to accommodate religious practices
such as the Islamic daily prayer cycle or observance of the Saturday
Sabbath, so long as the non-accommodation is part of a generally
applicable principle.'93 Were a government to forbid its employees from
ceasing work for the purpose of facing Mecca and praying, it would no
doubt offend the Employment Division v. Smith principle, as elaborated
by Lukumi Babalu Aye."' But if the same government simply enforced a
policy prohibiting its employees from taking breaks during work for
personal reasons, the fact that such a policy would prevent a devout
Muslim from performing a portion of his daily prayer ritual would not
carry constitutional significance.
193. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (i993)
194. Id. at 537 ("[I]n circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general
requirement are available, the government 'may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious
hardship' without compelling reason."' (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(989))).
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Rent-seeking will take many forms, most of them constitutionally
acceptable in the pattern of legislative primacy. Public choice theory
suggests at least some likely results from this rent-seeking. Because
"interest group politics redistributes wealth and political power away
from segments of the population that do not belong to any organized
interest group,"" it is plausible to think that the well-organized and
increasingly energetic adherents to traditional, often fundamentalist,
religions are likely to be the principal beneficiaries of legislative primacy.
Moreover, no interest "group can afford to drop out of the contest for
government handouts"'' 9 because dropouts will be in the unenviable
position of subsidizing those that persevere in rent-seeking, "thus
redistributing income to the remaining contestants. ' '97 Finally, religious
rent-seeking "foster[s] an atmosphere of cynicism that is incompatible
with a healthy democracy."' 8 The task for legislative primacy is to
control rent-seeking at least to the point that it does not corrode the
democratic process. It is hyperbolic but, perhaps, worthwhile to posit a
possibility of competing theocracies battling for supremacy.
RewardingSuccessful Proselytizers
A corollary proposition to the prior discussion of rent-seeking is the
observation that legislative primacy delivers an incentive to proselytize.
No doubt this is an unintended consequence of legislative primacy, but it
is nonetheless a consequence. As religious groups come to understand
the new terrain of legislative primacy and bend their efforts toward rentseeking, they will quickly realize the competitive advantage to be gained
by actively and successfully recruiting new adherents. Because legislative
primacy gives to governments an enlarged ability to deliver benefits to
religion, there is reason to think that legislators will respond to the
wishes of their constituents. The effects of increased proselytizing would
not necessarily be limited to obtaining partisan sectarian advantage, but
may be expected to produce a general increase in the pace and volume of
governmental benefits that aid religion, an effect that is likely to spur
additional zeal to win converts. I take no position on whether increased
religiosity of the people, assuming it should occur, is a good or bad
development. Rather, I wish merely to point out the iterative effects on
government and religion that may (I stress, may) flow from judicial
adoption of the marketplace paradigm for the plaza that symbolically sits
between the Capitol and the Cathedral.
Moreover, increased emphasis on proselytizing will likely harden
2.

195. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV.
873, 9o6 (1987).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 907.
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differences between religious groups. Among those of a fundamentalist
disposition, this is not likely to produce much incremental suspicion or
dislike, for it is the nature of each version of fundamentalism to be
certain that its faith alone possesses the universal, divine truth. Radical
fundamentalist Muslims praise the greatness of God, just as do
fundamentalist Christians, and each is equally certain that the other is an
infidel.'99 Increased proselytizing activity is likely to occur mostly among
the traditional religious faiths, but spiritualists and public secularists will
feel pressure to gain new adherents, lest they be losers in the rentseeking game permitted by legislative primacy. Of course, in a postmodern world characterized also by marketplace competition, one might
simply observe that if there should be fewer public secularists and
spiritualists than fundamentalists, the losers have nothing about which to
complain. One must wonder, however, whether this result is fully
consistent with the ideal of a polity in which faith is private. I do not
mean to suggest that those of religious faith should check their faith at
the Capitol steps; I simply wish to point out the overtly political nature of
religious proselytizing in the scenario I have sketched. That sort of fusion
of politics and religion is of a different quality than voting for candidates
that adhere to public values consistent with one's religious beliefs and
lobbying the legislature for secular policies that are consistent with one's
religious values.
3. Inflamed Debate About Religion in Public Life
A final corollary to both the rent-seeking and proselytization
hypotheses set forth above is to note that these developments will likely
result in the injection of considerably more energy into political and civic
debate about the relative size of the secular and religious dimensions of
public life. Although our law of free speech gives governments
considerably more latitude to advocate ideas when it acts as the speaker
rather than when it regulates private speech,2" the law of the Religion
Clauses treats government speech that advocates religion as
presumptively void.2 'O The endorsement test as a device to detect
forbidden establishments of religion is founded upon that principle, but
even when the endorsement test is not used, this idea has powerful force.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, for example, the Court struck down a Maryland
constitutional provision that made belief in God a requirement for
holding public office, reasoning that the provision impermissibly invaded
"freedom of belief and religion.',2 02 West Virginia State Board of
199. Cf. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 93 (Oxford University Press 1999) (1911)
("infidel" is defined: "In New York, one who does not believe in the Christian religion; in
Constantinople, one who does.").
200. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
201.

See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (i96i).

202.

Id.
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Education v. Barnette, which struck down a mandatory flag salute, was
founded on the illegitimacy of coercing belief or speech." As the basis
for voiding school prayer and Bible readings, Engel and Schempp relied
on their indirectly coercive effect, 4 their distinctivelY religious
character, 5 and the need for maintaining "strict neutrality"' in order to
avoid any "union of government and religion.'"'" Lee v. Weisman, which
voided prayers at a public school graduation ceremony, was premised
upon the psychological coercion of such prayers in that. setting."" Of
course, the Court has relied upon history and tradition to uphold prayers
at the opening of a state legislative session" and to uphold the public
exhibition of a creche along with secular symbols of the December
holiday season,"I' but these apparent aberrations may amount to nothing
more than a recognition that history and frequent repetition turn some
nominally religious themes into a mere "'ceremonial deism .....
Moreover, the Court has voided a law prohibiting the teaching of
evolution in the public schools due to the law's premise that evolution
was inconsistent with religion," ' and has struck down a law requiring the
teaching of creation science and evolution if either theory was taught in
the public schools, on the ground that the law lacked any secular
purpose." 3
However, lower courts have held that Free Exercise rights were not
offended when school districts used reading texts that parents and their
children genuinely believed repeatedly presented and advocated ideas
that were inimical to their religious beliefs,1 4 nor was any forbidden
endorsement of hostility to religion found when the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors officially condemned "religious organizations" such as
"the Religious Right," and characterized their views as "erroneous and
full of lies. 2. 5 The court of appeals concluded that no colorable claim was
presented "so long as there is no actual or threatened imposition of
203. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (943).

204. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
205. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that Bible readings were a
"religious ceremony ... intended by the State to be so").
206. Id. at 225.
207. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
208. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992).

209. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,795 (1983).
210. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681, 687 (1984).
211. Id. at 76 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J.
83, 86 (1964) (quoting from memory Eugene Rostow's unpublished 1962 Meiklejohn Lecture
delivered at Brown University)).
212. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, io9 (1968).
213. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,596-97 (5987).

214. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d IO58 (6th Cir. 1987).
215. Am. Family Ass'n v. San Francisco, 277 F.3d I114, 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).
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government power or sanction. ' 216 Judge Noonan, in dissent, posed the
following hypothetical:
Suppose a city council today, in the year 2002, adopted a resolution
condemning Islam because its teachings embraced the concept of a
holy war and so, the resolution said, were "directly correlated" with
the bombing of the World Trade Center. Plausibly the purpose might
be to discourage terror bombings. Would any reasonable, informed
observer doubt that the primary effect of such an action by a city could
be the expression of official hostility to the religion practiced by a
billion people?" 7
Or, to reverse the pattern, one wonders if the Ninth Circuit would apply
the same test to a resolution of the city council of Idaho Falls praising
Jerry Falwell for his conviction that "the Bible is the revealed Word of
God."
In a world of legislative primacy, we can expect these clashes to
become sharper. The asymmetry that permits San Francisco to condemn
religion but forbids Idaho Falls from praising religion will provoke
further and more vigorous battles in the legislative arena. Should the
principles of neutrality, equality, and non-discrimination ultimately
eliminate this asymmetry by broadening legislative primacy, the conflicts
will only become more fierce. Moreover, relaxation on one front will
invite relaxation on other fronts. If symmetry is achieved by rejecting
endorsement as the operative test and relying solely upon coercion as the
test of forbidden establishments, which is the only way in which
symmetry and broadening of legislative primacy can simultaneously be
achieved, we can envision a world in which rent-seeking takes the form
of obtaining official pronouncements of jurisdictional loyalty to one
religion or another. If that scenario seems farfetched or implausible, it is
only because you do not think that legislative primacy will be taken to
that extreme. To be sure, there is no indication that the will exists to
repudiate the large body of law that prevents governments, in the main,
from using religion as a device to shape public culture. Even so, it may
pay to speculate a bit on the shape of an alternative future.
B.

EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE OF RELIGION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Thus far, I have offered speculation in places about the future nature
of the patterns of Religion Clauses jurisprudence, and some of those
musings include speculation concerning the probable effects of the
marketplace approach on constitutional doctrine. I shall endeavor not to
repeat what has gone before; in this section I shall try to summarize
briefly some of the likely additional effects of that approach on the law
216. Id. at 1125.
217. Id. at 1127 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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of the Religion Clauses.
i. The Terminal Irrelevanceof Lemon v. Kurtzman
Lemon v. Kurtzman may be both the Energizer BunnyTM and the
TimexTM watch of the law of the Religion Clauses. '8 It "keeps on going
and going" and while "it takes a beating, it keeps on ticking." Lemon's
trilogy of secular purpose, neutral effect, and lack of excessive
entanglement between church and state, while modified, attacked,
ignored, and prematurely buried, is still around to bedevil us. Justice
Scalia has derided Lemon as akin to a
ghoul.., that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried,....
[Blut we can command it to return to the tomb at will. When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to
uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a
middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than helpful
signposts.". 9
As we have seen in the prior discussion of legislative primacy, Lemon has
already been effectively eclipsed by the principles of neutrality, equality,
and non-discrimination. Government action, especially provision of aid,
will survive Religion Clauses scrutiny if it (i) is facially neutral with
respect to religious and secular beneficiaries, (2) uses private choice as
the medium of selection of religious beneficiaries, and (3)does not
discriminate among religious beneficiaries.22 While Lemon will likely
continue to be cited and purportedly applied from time to time, it will be
largely devoid of substance. Instead of a critical review of purpose and
effect, the principles of neutrality, equality and non-discrimination will
supply the analytical force with respect to governmental financial aid to
religion (which is all that Lemon was supposed to be about, anyway).
The judiciary will patrol the other frontiers of legislative primacy, using
the tools of coercion and endorsement. Legislative primacy will make
Lemon terminally irrelevant, if not dead. The ghost of Lemon will stalk
the pages of the United States Reports for some time, but it is only "a
docile and useful monster," stripped of its vitality."'
2.
IncreasedEmphasis on Non-discriminationBetween
Religious Groups
Legislative primacy means an increased emphasis on nondiscrimination as a sometimes determinative principle. If a significant

U.S. 602, 624-25 (I97I).
219. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch. Dist., 5o8 U.S. 384, 398-99 (993)
218. 403

(Scalia, J., concurring)

(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,741 (I973)).

220. See id. at 395 (citing the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 62425 (I97)).

22 1. Id. at 399.
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behavioral effect of legislative primacy is vastly increased religious rentseeking, it is entirely predictable that the judiciary will be asked to decide
when ostensibly neutral legislative actions between religious groups in
fact embody impermissible discrimination against a particular minority
religious group. The problem is hardly new; the leading case is Larson v.
Valente. 2 Minnesota required charitable organizations that solicit
donations to register and report periodically to the state, and stipulated
that a charity's registration could be withdrawn for misconduct." 3
Initially, Minnesota exempted all religious organizations from these
requirements, but then changed the rule to exempt only those religious
organizations that solicited more than half of their contributions from
members of the organization. 4 The Court concluded that the exemption,
while facially neutral as to religion, "clearly grants [a] denominational
preference"2 5 in favor of well-established religious groups with generous
supporting members, and against new groups who solicit funds from the
general public, either by inclination or religious duty."6 This preference,
though not evident on the face of the law, was revealed by legislative
history that disclosed one Minnesota legislator's desire to "deal with the
religious organizations that are soliciting on the street," another's
explanation that "what you're trying to get at here is the people who are
running around airports and running around streets and soliciting
people," and yet another legislator's puzzlement over "why we're so hot
to regulate the Moonies. '27 After detecting a legislative purpose to
discriminate among religions, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found
no justification for this offense against the "clearest command of the
Establishment Clause[:] that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.......
By contrast to Larson, Gillette v. United States upheld an exemption
from conscription for those possessing religious objection to participation
in all wars, rather than those possessing a more selective religious
objection to war. 29 The effect, of course, was to favor Quakers and other
sects opposed by religious faith to all war, and to disfavor Roman
222. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). A precursor to Larson was Murdock v. Pennsylvania,in which the
Court invalidated a municipal ordinance that required Jehovah's Witnesses who solicited donations in
exchange for religious literature to pay a tax and obtain a license. The Court found this to be "a flat
tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights." 319 U.S. 105, I13 (1943).
223. Larson, 456 U.S. at 230-31.
224. Id. at 231-32.
225. Id. at 246.
226. For example, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (more popularly known as
the Hare Krishnas) practice Sankirtan, a religious ritual "which enjoins its members to go into public
places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna
religion." Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,645 (1981).
227. Larson, 456 U.S. at 254-55.
228. Id. at 244.
229. 401 U.S. 437, 454 (I97I).
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Catholics and others who hold religious scruples against unjust wars. The
Court in Gillette found no sectarian preference because the statute, "on
its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation
or religious belief ... [but] says that anyone who is conscientiously

opposed to all war shall be relieved of military service," and because
"neutral and secular... reasons" for the selective exemption existed.23
The Court in Larson distinguished Gillette by noting that an individual
Catholic who held a religious opposition to all wars could avail himself of
the exemption; thus, the Gillette exemption did not, as in Larson, focus
"precisely and solely upon religious organizations. '23 Without proof of
any discriminatory purpose, the Court held the statutory exemption
valid, despite its disproportionately discriminatory impact. 32
This emphasis upon discriminatory purpose can be seen in other
cases as well. In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District
v. Grumet,33 the Court invalidated New York's attempt to create a public
school district precisely drawn to include only members of the Satmar
Hasidic sect of Jews. Because New York had delegated its authority "to a
group defined by its character as a religious community," it had violated
the central command of religious neutrality that governments favor
"neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively
' In Kiryas Joel, evidence of discriminatory purpose
over nonadherents."234
stemmed from the sharply discriminatory effects, just as an inference of
racially discriminatory purpose arose from similarly discriminatory
effects in the facts of Gomillion v. Lightfoot.23 The conclusion that a
successful claim of religious discrimination requires proof of
discriminatory purpose is further buttressed by Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.36 Minnesota limited those who
wished to distribute literature and solicit donations at the Minnesota
State Fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds. 37 This rule had
the effect of curtailing the Krishnas' practice of Sankirtan, the religious
ritual of distributing literature to and soliciting donations from the
general public. , 8 The Court upheld the rule because it applied equally to
all religious and non-religious groups and was supported by adequate

,

230. Id. at 450 454.
231. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47 n.23.
232. Id.
233. 512 U.S. 687,696 (994).
234. Id. at 696.
235. 364 U.S. 339, 340 (i96o) (finding intentional racial discrimination inferred from a change of
municipal boundaries from a square to an "uncouth twenty-eight sided figure" with the effect of
removing not one white voter but 99 percent of the black voters).
236. 452 U.S. 640, 654 (i98I).
237. Id. at 643.
238. Id. at 645.
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secular reasons of crowd control.239 Though the effect of the rule was
undoubtedly more burdensome to the Krishnas than, say, Lutherans,
there was no proof of discriminatory purpose.
Legislative primacy is apt to increase the number of such cases. As
religious rent-seeking increases and legislators respond to these
pressures, cases like Larson and Kiryas Joel are likely to proliferate.
Larson provides a good example of sectarian rent-seeking in the form of
imposition of disadvantage upon a rival, disfavored, minority sect. Kiryas
Joel offers a good example of naked sectarian rent-seeking in the form of
positive benefits to the supplicant sect. Moreover, legislatures learn from
judicial experience. New York, for example, responded to Kiryas Joel by
twice reenacting legislation to deliver the originally intended effects to
the Satmar Hasidic community of Kiryas Joel, but employing more
facially neutral means of doing so. The first attempt failed because only
the Kiryas Joel community met the ostensibly neutral criteria.24 The
second attempt, which permitted municipalities within an existing school
district to form their own independent school district if they met certain
wealth and population criteria designed to ensure the sustainability of
each resulting school district, also failed because it had the
"impermissible effect of advancing one religious sect."24 ' Whether New
York could devise any method of enabling Kiryas Joel to create its own
school district, given this history, remains unsettled. No doubt the
Minnesota legislature, in future attempts to deal with solicitation by
religious organizations, will be far more circumspect in its floor colloquy.
However, this only suggests that the Court will have a harder time
detecting impermissible discriminatory purpose in the cases that arrive
on the steps of its Greek Revival temple; it does not suggest that the
problem will disappear.
To the extent that disadvantages are likely to be imposed in the form
of facially neutral rules, the Court will face a choice between accepting
such neutrality at its face value or inquiring into the purposes behind the
legislation, the effects it produces, or both. The history of the Lemon test
leaves little reason to suppose that such inquiry will be very searching
(especially concerning the effects of governmental action), and, even if it
is, one can expect the Court to quarrel over the issue of whether to look
to actual purposes, stated purposes, or hypothetical purposes as the
touchstone of decision on that point. The experience in Equal Protection
doctrine with respect to this issue is not particularly encouraging. The
Court says it accepts hypothetical purposes for minimal, or "rational
basis," scrutiny, yet it looks to stated and actual purposes in a fair
239. Id. at 654.
240.

See Grumet v. Cuomo, 68I N.E.2d 340, 348-49 (i997).

241.

See Grumet v. Pataki, 720 N.E.2d 66,67 (1999).

November 2005]

POLITICAL MARKETPLACE OF RELIGION

number of cases that purport to apply minimal scrutiny.24 Perhaps the
Court's resolution of this issue, in the context of claimed religious
discrimination, will involve importing the disparate impact principles of
Washington v. Davis43 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,2" which place upon the plaintiff the burden of
proving intentional discrimination as a factor that motivated adoption of
the challenged law in order to trigger strict scrutiny, but which leaves the
government with an opportunity to rebut the prima facie case of
intentional discrimination by proof that it would have taken the same
course of action for non-discriminatory reasons. 4 Legislative primacy
suggests that the Court will need to develop some version of disparate
impact analysis to deal with hidden instances of religious discrimination.
3. Sharpened Conflict Between "Endorsement" and "Coercion"
If, as I have supposed, Lemon becomes even more of a relic and less
an all-purpose test for detecting Establishment Clause violations, the
burden of that function will increasingly fall upon the endorsement and
coercion tests. The endorsement test, in its modern form, was first
articulated by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly.4 She noted that the Establishment Clause "prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community," and asserted that
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion" would violate this
principle: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message. "247

Coercion, as a distinct test for forbidden establishments, has a mixed
and more controversial lineage. In the course of striking down voluntary
prayer in the public schools in Engel v. Vitale, the Court declared that a
242. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (I996) (applying minimal scrutiny but concluding
from the extremely broad legal disabilities imposed on homosexuals by the classification at issue that
the actual purpose was to harm homosexuals as a class by making them "stranger[s] to [the] laws");
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (applying minimal
scrutiny in concluding that the classification, as applied, "rest[s] on an irrational prejudice against the

mentally retarded"); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179-8o (198o) (Applying minimal
scrutiny, the Court divides over whether legislative purpose is to be determined from the face of the
classification at issue, the hypothetical purpose, the stated purpose, or the actual purpose.); U.S. Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (973) (applying minimal scrutiny but concluding from the
legislative history that the actual purpose of the classification was simply "to harm a politically
unpopular group" (alternative holding)).
243. 426 U.S. 229, 252 (976).
244. 429 U.S. 252, 270 0977).

245. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
246. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 687, 688.
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violation of the Establishment Clause "does not depend upon any
showing of direct government compulsion."24s Rather, the clause "is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals
or not."249 Judge McConnell has pointed out that precedent prior to
Engel not only failed to support this assertion but also directly
contradicted it."' In any case, the comment was dictum; the Court
expressly concluded that the prayers at issue involved coercive pressure
upon religious minorities because they were backed by the considerable
force of government."' Judge McConnell has also reminded us that at the
center of the historical record upon which the Establishment Clause is
built, one finds the concept that coercion of religious belief or
observance is the "essence of an establishment" of religion. 5
In Lee v. Weisman, the Court eschewed Lemon and applied coercion
as the test for a claimed Establishment violation, but arguably stretched
the concept beyond the breaking point, thus making the test nearly
useless in application.253 At issue was the validity of bland, ecumenical
prayers of invocation and benediction delivered at the graduation
ceremony of a public middle school. 54 The Court considered the prayers
a forbidden establishment, finding "subtle coercive pressure" at work:
the school's "supervision and control" of the graduation ceremony
placed "public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect,
can be as real as any overt compulsion." '55 Justice Scalia derided this
'' 6
"psychological coercion" argument as "incoherent, 25
noting that the
coercion identified amounted to a compulsion to stand, at most, and a
compulsion to maintain a respectful silence, at least."7 That subtle and
indirect pressure to exhibit common courtesy to a public speaker
becomes the sort of coercion that preoccupied men such as Madison
involves a leap of logic that I find difficult to comprehend.""
248. 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).

249. Id.
250. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &

MARY

L.

REV. 933,934-35 (1986).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31.
McConnell, supra note 250, at 937. But see Douglas Laycock, "Non-Coercive" Support for
Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (991).
253. 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992).
251.

252.

254. Id. at 58o.
255. Id. at 592, 593256. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 637.
258. In debate concerning the Establishment Clause in the First Congress, Madison declared that
he "apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
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Whatever the current status of coercion as an independent test, it is
foreseeable that coercion will play a larger role as the pattern of
legislative primacy matures. Hard coercion-compulsion backed by force
with real penalties attached to non-compliance-will appeal to those who
seek to push the judicial boundaries of establishment further to the
margins, particularly when the issue involves the degree to which
religious ceremony should play a part in public culture. The endorsement
test will no doubt serve as the preferred tool for those wishing to retain
judicial control over the role of religious ceremony in the public weal.
Thus, we can expect conflict concerning which test to deploy in any given
instance to intensify. One could also predict that the version of coercion
used in Lee v. Weisman may develop into a vehicle for mediating this
conflict. Soft coercion-the subtle psychological pressure to refrain from
manifesting one's dissent by words or action-will enable those wishing
to retain judicial control over the role of religious ceremony in public to
chant the mantra of coercion while applying something much more akin
to endorsement.
4. Heightened JudicialFocus on Legislative Purpose
Legislative primacy is also apt to heighten the focus on legislative
purpose. Of course, inquiry into purpose is already integral to the Lemon
test; my claim is not that examination of purpose is new, but that the
importance of the inquiry may increase under legislative primacy. This
magnified focus is already apparent with respect to putatively neutral
laws that, in effect, disproportionately favor some religious groups over
others and that are analyzed as possible impermissible establishments.259
The same phenomenon is likely to occur with respect to legislative action
that treats religion unfavorably and that allegedly interferes
impermissibly with free exercise. Locke v. Davey may supply an example
of the future.z6' Even though the Washington provision at issue in Davey
was facially discriminatory against religion, the Court upheld its validity
under Free Exercise analysis because:
[T]he subject of religion is one in which both the United States and
[Washington] constitutions embody distinct views-in favor of free
exercise, but opposed to establishment-that find no counterpart with
respect to other callings or professions. That a State would deal
their conscience." i ANNALS OF CONGRESS 758 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance, penned during the Virginia Assessment Bill fight, amply displays his concern with a
much harder-edged, backed-by-force-of-law sort of coercion. See McConnell, supra note 250, at 937-

38.
259. See text accompanying notes 222-45; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97

(1987) (voiding a requirement that both creation science and evolution be taught in the public schools
if either theory was taught); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, IO9 (1968) (striking down a ban on the
teaching of evolution in the public schools on the basis of an impermissible purpose to advance
religion).
260. 540 U.S. 7I2,720-21 (2004).
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differently with religious education for the ministry than with
education for other callings is a product of these views, not evidence of
hostility toward religion. '
To be sure, the Court also thought that the negative effects upon
religion of Washington's open refusal to permit students to use its
scholarship funds to pursue a degree in theology were less severe than in
prior such cases. Unlike Lukumi Babalu Aye,262 the Washington
provision imposed "neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of
6
religious service or rite. ' 263 Unlike McDaniel v. Paty,2
4 it did "not deny to
ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the
community. ' 2 65 Nor did it force a choice between adherence to "religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit. '266 Nonetheless, judicial
examination of legislative purpose was a key factor in Davey's
willingness to defer to Washington's
judgment concerning naked
67
discriminatory treatment of religion.'
Examining legislative purpose is a dicey business at best, but the law
of the Religion Clauses demands that the judiciary do so. The inquiry
under Lemon, and presumably elsewhere in the law of the Religion
Clauses, focuses on "whether [the] government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. ' '6 Yet the difficulty inherent in
divining the actual purpose of a single person in connection with some
action is nothing when compared with the difficulty of determining the
actual purpose of a collective body engaged in legislating. Justice Scalia
has illustrated many of these problems in his dissent in Edwards v.
Aguillard. 69 However, it is not only improbable that the inquiry will
cease, but highly probable that the occasions for invocation will
increase-even if Lemon shrivels into a jurisprudential raisin.
5.

Some Final Post-Modern Speculations

Lest the reader think that legislative primacy supplies a recipe for
endless sectarian strife, with little intervention from the courts, consider
some final possibilities of the post-modern sensibility as manifested in
religious belief and conduct. The basic religious divide in a post-modern
world separates pre-modern fundamentalist religion and post-modern
261. Id. at 721.
262. 508 U.S. 520,537 (1993)

263. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
264. 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
265. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.

266. Id. at 72o-21; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 14546 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409
(1963).
267. See id.
268. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 69o
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
269. 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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spirituality. Fundamentalism, of whatever brand, asserts a universal and
exclusive truth. "Fundamentalism presuppbses a single transcendent
reality which does not change and to which believers must consequently
accommodate themselves, rather than vice versa. 27 Post-modernism, of
course, denies any such possibility. As a result, the religious sensibilities
of post-modernists tend toward the spiritual, focusing inward upon the
contingent nature of ourselves, rather than outward upon the eternal,
fixed message of a God beyond our knowledge and demanding fealty to
his-and not our-standard.
A question that hovers over the metaphysical cusp in which we live
is whether the post-modern understanding will displace pre-modern
fundamentalism, or whether fundamentalism will triumph and displace
post-modernism. I do not pretend to know the answer, but I do offer
some preliminary thoughts, coupled with some observations about the
probable related effects on the law of the Religion Clauses.
Fundamentalism requires a sublimation of individual will to the demands
of an eternal God. How does one apprehend the will of God? The truly
pre-modern answer was to listen to the pronouncements of the priest and
accept his intermediation between God and man as infallible. But as
modernism flexed its metaphysical muscle, Christian fundamentalism
took a new turn. The Reformation posited that the intermediary was
unnecessary; man could divine God's will by reading His Word. Thus
Protestant fundamentalism was born. But what is the meaning of God's
Word? In a modern age, this could be settled within denominations by a
shared understanding supplied by clergy, interpretive literature, and the
communion of shared fellowship, but in a post-modern world in which
experience is increasingly isolated or mediated through a seemingly
infinite supply of informational sources, the possibility of a common
understanding of the eternal truth upon which fundamentalism stands
seems to fall into greater jeopardy. Thus, there is reason to suppose that
the appeal of fundamentalism as a coherent, unified, universal truth will
diminish. This has led some commentators to speculate that
"[flundamentalism will no doubt survive, but [only] as a niche product
appealing to a narrow segment of the market for religious experienceperhaps dominant in its category, but lacking mass appeal. 27'
By contrast, post-modern spirituality is inherently flexible and
malleable. All avenues to self-discovery are equally valid. The postmodernist cleric offers what sells, and it comes in many more flavors than
Baskin-Robbins ice cream. This does not mean that the post-modern
spiritual product is any less religious; it does suggest that the climate of
270. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Religious Experience in the Age of Digital
Reproduction,79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 127, 156 (2005).
271. Id. at 158.
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post-modemism suits post-modemist spirituality. Post-modemist
spirituality lacks judgment; it speaks not of sin but of self-harming
behavior. It asks neither commitment to duty nor obligation of its
adherents; it offers therapy by affirming the inherent value of each
individual and the promise of discovering one's own self-worth. It offers
not God's unconditional love obtained by an embrace of that which he
freely offers to those who believe, but the promise of an unconditional
love of each individual premised upon the inherent value of human
experience. Thus, one would expect that post-modem spirituality would
be a huge marketing success, and perhaps it is and will continue to be.
For the moment, assume the vast appeal of spirituality, an appeal so
encompassing that it will eclipse fundamentalism, at least in America.
Should that be so, the flaws (if so they be) in legislative primacy are not
so much flaws as they are virtues. A nation overwhelmingly composed of
a Panglossian272 spirituality that caters to every individual need has little
to fear from cession to the legislatures of the power to accommodate, or
not accommodate, religion. Such a nation is not very likely to spawn
organized religious groups that fervently believe their message must be
ensconced in the public square.
But will spiritualism triumph? Perhaps, but it may be equally likely
that the pursuit of self-directed spirituality will, in the end, leave its
practitioners with a hollow and empty feeling. It is beyond my ken to say
that post-modern spirituality supplies empty calories for the spirit, a sort
of fast food for the soul, but that possibility exists. Perhaps the decline of
modernism's faith in rational explanation will ultimately result in a
popular embrace of that which is claimed to be eternal. If so, the
demands placed upon legislative primacy will be large, the stress
enormous. As William Butler Yeats put it, "Turning and turning in the
widening gyre ....
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold." '73
CONCLUSION

The law of the Religion Clauses presents primarily a judicial exercise
in mediating the inherent conflict between the clauses, for the Free
Exercise Clause requires some accommodations of religion and the
Establishment Clause prohibits other accommodations of religion.
Judicial mediation of this tension will produce one of four distinctive
patterns, each characterized by the relative degree of deference the
judiciary displays toward legislative judgments of appropriate
accommodation that are claimed to offend the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, or both. Judicial primacy is the pattern in which

272. Doctor Pangloss was, of course, the creation of Voltaire in his work, Candide.
273. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W. B.
(Macmillan Co. 1933).

YEATS
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the Court displays the least deference toward legislative judgments of
religious accommodation, by means of robust enforcement of both
clauses. Legislative primacy is the polar opposite of judicial primacy.
Under legislative primacy, the Court defers to legislative judgments of
religious accommodation by lax enforcement of both clauses. Judicial
secularism is a pattern by which the Court vigorously enforces the
Establishment Clause and loosely enforces the Free Exercise Clause,
thus restricting the ability of legislatures to decide when to accommodate
religion without violating the Establishment Clause but leaving them
with relatively greater freedom to decide whether or not to
accommodate religious conduct. Judicial accommodation is a pattern by
which the Court energetically enforces the Free Exercise Clause to
require many accommodations of religious conduct, but evinces less
willingness to strike down other types of accommodations that allegedly
violate the Establishment Clause. Judicial accommodation gives
legislatures considerable freedom to accommodate religion without
violating the Establishment Clause, but requires them to accommodate
religious conduct.
When the law of the Religion Clauses began to develop in earnest in
the middle of the twentieth century, it developed toward the judicial
primacy pattern, but as the century waned and turned the millennial
milepost, the law of the Religion Clauses began to assume the shape of
legislative primacy. Political and cultural changes have influenced this
change. The de facto Protestant establishment that persisted from the
nation's beginning to the twentieth century collapsed by mid-century; in
its wake, a new coalition of religious and secular allies began to press for
broader governmental assistance to religion. At the same time, the age of
modernity-the Enlightenment commitment to rationalism as the avenue
to truth, which had replaced the medieval commitment to religious
faith-began to be undermined by post-modernism, the belief that there
are no universal truths. Modernity posed a conflict between two
competing explanations of truth; post-modernism accepts that no account
can be known to be true. The paradoxical result is that religion has been
freed from the margins to which modernity had consigned it. Moreover,
much of traditional religion has been replaced by a distinctively postmodern spirituality, a preoccupation with self-understanding that
borrows eclectically from many ways of apprehending transcendent
reality, both religious and secular. The resulting religious pluralism has
increased the pressure upon political actors to accommodate a variety of
religions and, simultaneously, made imperative the need to avoid
compelling governments to accommodate the limitless variety of conduct
that may represent the product of religious belief.
Legislative primacy produces both behavioral and doctrinal effects.
The principal behavioral effect consists of encouraging a political
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marketplace of religion, in which religious and secular actors engage in
rent-seeking in the form of government benefits to religion. Benefits,
however, can come in the form of favors bestowed on any given rentseeker or burdens placed on rival rent-seekers. By-products of religious
rent-seeking include increased proselytizing, because successful
proselytizers will secure an advantage in religious rent-seeking, and
increased contentiousness concerning the proper role of religion in
public life. The likely doctrinal effects of legislative primacy include the
terminal irrelevance of Lemon, increased emphasis on nondiscrimination between religious groups, a sharper conflict between the
competing endorsement and coercion tests for detecting Establishment
Clause violations, and a heightened judicial focus upon the legislative
purpose underlying ostensibly neutral measures that deliver religious
effects.
While it is too soon to know whether legislative primacy will
ameliorate or exacerbate religious conflict, it is not too soon to declare
our entrance into a new era of the law of the Religion Clauses. Perhaps
the metaphysics of post-modernism will produce sufficient religious
toleration that the political dynamic of religious rent-seeking will
moderate, and will result in an increase in aggregate preference
satisfaction without destabilizing side effects. But it is also possible that
the mixture of extreme religious pluralism, post-modern uncertainty, and
religious rent-seeking will prove to be volatile. Let us hope the Court will
be attentive to the effects of legislative primacy and modify it as
necessary to account for conditions as they develop.

